

81-7, 182

UNDER THE CLOAK & BEHIND THE DAGGER

The CIA in Chile

25¢

For many years previous to the election of Salvador Allende, Chile had been the focus of much attention from the United States. It had always received abundant inflows of cash and arms; it was the showcase of "democracy" for the Alliance for Progress, the testing ground for the Peace Corps in Latin America, and a focal point for the liberal economic programs of the United Nations. This history, combined with the current alignment of forces within Latin America in general, led the United States to the decision that its main objective in dealing with Chile was of a political nature.

The optimal scenario, as seen by the US ruling class, would be to engineer the situation in such a way that the overthrow of the Allende government appeared to be the product of its internal inability (and, most importantly, the inability of socialism) to

satisfy the people. Chile was to become the example for the rest of Latin America that socialism does not work—that it is not a viable alternative to capitalism. In other words, Chile was to be used to defeat the example of Cuba. The importance of achieving this political goal would mean that, at least in the short run, certain economic and military interests would have to be set aside.

Once this political decision was taken, it was then necessary to implement that strategy. If the overthrow of Allende were to appear as an internal failure, the methods used by the United States to promote this failure would have to be covert. The role of the United States would have to be invisible. The situation in Chile was particularly suited to this kind of activity. The class war which was being waged between 1970-1973 was not primarily characterized by armed struggle, but rather was an ideological war supported by tactical offensives in the economic and psychological arena.

The formulation of the tactics to be used within this overall strategy was the work of the "Forty Committee," a subcommittee of the National Security Council. Headed by Henry Kissinger, the Forty Committee approves all major clandestine operations abroad. It is here that the basic tenets of the plan

This article is a condensed version of a report by the North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA). The full report is available from NACLA (P.O. Box 57, Cathedral Station, New York, NY 10025) for \$1.00 plus .20 postage. The condensed version appeared in WIN magazine, Nov. 7, 1974, and is reprinted by permission of WIN Magazine and NACLA.

were decided upon. These included: 1) creation of economic chaos aimed at alienating the petit bourgeoisie and the labor aristocracy while disrupting the normal functioning of society; 2) use of paramilitary actions to create an atmosphere of chaos; 3) support for a well-oiled propaganda apparatus which would be used to confuse the population ideologically and to disseminate misinformation; 4) strengthening of right-wing sectors through covert funding, advice and resources supplied by the United States; and 5) debilitating and dividing the Left by exacerbating internal divisions and weaknesses created by reformist politics. These activities would create the necessary conditions for the three main prongs needed to carry out the overthrow of the *Unidad Popular* (UP) government: the creation of a mass-based opposition, the ideological and practical preparation of the military to ensure their successful intervention at the correct moment, the weakening of the Left by fostering internal divisions.

THE CIA

The CIA structure is headed by the Resident whose cover is generally that of an executive with a multinational company—a natural and universally usable cover for US intelligence agents given the nature of imperialism. Beneath the Resident are a team of case officers who are also US citizens and full-time employees of the Agency. In Chile, the Resident receives orders directly from the chief of the Latin America Area Division of the Director of Operations in Washington. Each operation or type of operation which is ordered by the CIA is designated a "project" and then assigned to one of the case officers.

The job of the Resident and the case officers consists of building up in-country networks over the years so that when they are needed they can be activated simply and quickly. Recruits are gathered from a variety of places. Many are spotted in exchange programs conducted by the State Department, AID, USIA, AIFLD, private organizations, universities, foundations or CIA-sponsored training courses for

foreign officers at the International Police Academy. CIA recruiters pay particular attention to military personnel and students, both of whom are extremely upwardly mobile in Latin American Society and could provide a high-level government contact in the future. The foreign nationals recruited by the CIA form the base of the resident structure and the key to successful intelligence operations in the country. From 1960 to 1973 tens of thousands of Chileans participated in these exchange programs.

Between 1970 and 1973 the resident structure in Chile carried out a wide range of "projects": one case officer was in charge of overseeing the US plan of economic sabotage, another made sure that CIA-planted stories got into the Chilean press, another oversaw the network of "proprietarys" and conduits set up by the Agency to funnel arms and money to the right-wing, and yet another had to make sure that all political parties were being infiltrated on the highest level possible. In fact, most of the CIA's covert operations in Chile during the UP government were within one of these four areas: the economic offensive, paramilitary operations, funding and media operations.


THE ECONOMIC OFFENSIVE

Essential to setting the stage for a coup d'état was the creation of a mass base of opposition to the UP government and the fomenting of a situation of chaos which would justify military intervention. The economic offensive was designed to achieve these goals. At least three elements made up this offensive: the "invisible blockade," the manipulation of the world copper market and the priming of the black market within Chile.

The United States, because of the degree of its control over the Chilean economy in the past and its dominance of international financial organizations, was able to play a critical role in the manipulation of the Chilean economy between 1970-1973. The strategy involved both covert and overt actions, and CIA specialists were crucial to the carrying out and coordination of the two levels.

The plan began to take shape even before Allende became President. On September 29, 1970, William V. Broe, the CIA's head of Clandestine Services for Latin America, called Edward Gerrity of ITT to arrange a meeting. Previous to this, ITT had attempted to get CIA cooperation for a series of schemes without—according to testimony at the Senate hearings on ITT—much success. Now the CIA was approaching ITT. The Forty Committee had probably given the go-ahead in its September meeting.

Broe's suggestions to Gerrity at that meeting were the essence of what became the "invisible blockade": 1) banks delaying or not renewing credits; 2) companies delaying in sending payments and making deliveries; 3) pressure put on savings and loan associations to close down their operations in Chile; 4) withdrawal of technical help; and 5) approaching other corporations with an interest in Chile to suggest that they follow the same course of action. Despite the fact that Broe and the CIA deny that the plan was ever put into action, this is exactly what happened during the next year. The capacity for the United States to implement such a plan rested upon the dependent capitalist structure of Chile vis-a-vis the United States and the strength of US capital internationally.



The combined results of this strategy squeezed the economy from both the production and consumption end. Although production in many areas increased during the years of the UP government, its full growth was impeded in many sectors of the economy because of a lack of spare parts and capital, withheld by the invisible blockade. This caused serious consequences in terms of many consumer items and services—particularly transportation, as most Chilean buses were Fords—it helped foment the hostile reaction of sectors of the petit bourgeoisie toward the government. This is easily seen in the strikes of the truck and taxi owners who protested a lack of spare parts and tires. These strikes, in turn, were used by the Right as the basis for creating a mass opposition to the UP government.

The plan to squeeze production and consumption was to be complimented by an attack on Chile's main source of foreign exchange, the sale of copper. The CIA had long been known to manipulate commodity markets for the political benefit of the US ruling class. It tried every possible trick in the sugar market in order to weaken the Cuban Revolution. With copper accounting for 80 percent of Chile's exports, the CIA could not resist.

In March 1971 the *Banque Populaire Suisse* received a deposit from the Zurich-based Internordia Finance Corporation. The company said that the cash deposit represented its "exclusive world monopoly" on the sale of a huge quantity of electrolytic copper to be produced in Chile over the next ten years. However, this quantity represented far more copper than, in reality, Chile could produce.

When it was notified by the bank, the Chilean government said it knew nothing of the transaction. What was it all about? The effect of the deal was to imply that Chile had a far greater supply of copper than it admitted to, a far greater supply than it actually had. Given the fact that the world copper market is extremely sensitive to supply and demand, news of the existence of a new source of copper would have sent copper prices plummeting. And each drop of one cent in the price of copper over a year costs Chile approximately \$10 million in lost revenues.

Within a few days, the police in Santiago had arrested a North American, Howard C. Edwards, a Swiss citizen and two Argentines for their role in this plot. Edwards, arrested in his room in the Hotel Carrera—a Sheraton hotel which seems to have been a favorite haunt of CIA operatives—was found with papers pertaining to the copper deal as well as identification confirming him as an Intelligence Officer of the US government.

When this covert attempt to destroy Chile's copper market failed, the United States was forced to resort to more overt methods. In October 1972 the economic offensive was coordinated with mass mobilizations by opposition forces and a political offensive by opposition congressional leaders. As the streets of Santiago filled with striking truck drivers, shop keepers, bank workers and members of the merchant marine, the Congress met to begin impeachment proceedings against four of Allende's cabinet members. At the same time, in Paris, Kennecott introduced litigation to block the sale of Chilean copper abroad, arguing that the copper was still owned by the company.

The offensive was mounting. The effects of the economic offensive were beginning to have increasingly political ramifications.

The third aspect of the economic offensive—the stimulation of the black market—was a more complex matter. The CIA has always dealt on the currency black market and has agents around the world whose sole purpose is to trade dollars for local currency where exchange rates are particularly good. This allows the Agency to buy more for the money it is allotted in its annual budget and to launder the funds so they cannot be traced back to CIA headquarters in Langley, Va. In Chile, the black market was used not only to support covert activities, but also to drain money out of the economy.

PARAMILITARY OPERATIONS

After the election of Allende in September 1970, sectors within the CIA in coordination with ITT felt that Allende's assumption of the presidency still could be prevented. William Merriam wrote John McCone (ITT executive and former head of the CIA) in October 1970 and referred to his last meeting with people from the Agency. "Approaches continue to be made to select members of the Armed Forces," he wrote, "in an attempt to have them lead some sort of uprising—no success to date." One of the obstacles to this "success" was Army Commander in Chief, General Rene Schneider. While he was not pro-Marxist, Schneider refused to permit any military intervention in the democratic process in order to prevent Allende's confirmation as President.

At about the same time that Merriam was writing to McCone, the main office of ITT received communication from one of its "PR men" in Chile. It said that the military would only intervene if the country's stability were sufficiently threatened and that "the threat must be provided one way or another through provocation."

ITT's "PR man" was, in reality, a CIA agent—Robert Berrellez. Berrellez had worked for many years as an Associated Press reporter. He spent a good part of the years between 1959 and 1961 in Havana, Cuba. Following the Bay of Pigs invasion, Berrellez was expelled from the island and soon left his job at AP to join ITT's public relations department. With this new cover he arrived in Santiago in 1970 along with Hal Hendrix, also of ITT, to "report" on the situation for the company.

Berrellez must have seen in General Schneider what seemed to be the perfect opportunity for a "provocation."

It is the morning of October 22, 1970. General Schneider's car is on its usual route to his office. Suddenly, he is surrounded by four other cars and, within moments, shot and fatally wounded. As the ambulance rushes him to the Military Hospital, the men involved in his assassination begin to scatter.

Juan Luis Bulnes, later proved to be among those responsible for Schneider's death, headed immediately for the airport. There he picked up his ticket for Buenos Aires which earlier had been reserved for him in the name of Robert Berrellez. Berrellez, himself, would soon fly on to Buenos Aires, before Bulnes departed for his final destination—the United States.

As Schneider still lay in the hospital in a coma, Robert Viaux, a retired right-wing army general who was later proven to be the ring leader of the assass-



This October 1972 economic offensive included this mass mobilization of middle and upper class women. Pinochet recently announced that the Junta was planning to build a national monument to the "Chilean Woman."

sination plot, rushed to his house to burn any incriminating documents. Viaux had been in steady contact over a period of time with the United States and, in particular, Berrellez and Hendrix. In fact, when Viaux met with the two, he "was given verbal assurance that he would receive material help and support from the United States." But, despite the precautions which he took, Viaux was later arrested for his participation in the crime.

"Operation Alfa," as the plan to kidnap Schneider was called, was a plot by the Right to create a situation of terror in Chile and then blame it on the Left. The reactionaries had hoped that this might prove to be the provocation necessary to encourage the military to step in and prevent the confirmation of Allende as President by Congress. Instead, the plan was uncovered and quickly revealed by the Left. Allende demanded a change in the head of Investigations (the Police Department), Luis Jaspard De Fonseca, who was believed to have ties with the CIA. Shortly thereafter arrest warrants were issued for Viaux, Bulnes and others involved in the plot including the two sons of Guillermo Carey, a vice president of Anaconda Copper Company.

As the Right was quickly to learn, mass support for the UP government was too strong to allow it to be overthrown by an individual terrorist action. Paramilitary actions would have to be increasingly well-planned and executed. And they would have to be coordinated with the opposition's mass agitations. With the failure of the Schneider assassination *Patria y Libertad* was formed to carry out this plan.

Over the years, the CIA has put together a number of armies—the famous Meo Tribesmen in Laos, the Bolivian Rangers who assassinated Che, a special army team in Peru in the mid-sixties which was formed to fight the Peruvian guerrilla movement, and many more. Since 1962 over 600 Special Forces training teams, on loan to the CIA, have been sent to Latin America. The Special Operations Division (SOD) of the CIA oversees these activities.

The material needed by the SOD is obtained from the CIA's Office of Logistics which operates vast warehouses of weapons for just such purposes. A good part of the CIA's material comes from the US Army; the rest—a significant portion—comes from private arms companies, in particular, the International Armament Corporation in Alexandria, Virginia. But before the recruiting, training and supplying can begin, an internal army must be created.

Patria y Libertad was that army in Chile. The formation of *Patria y Libertad* was officially announced in March 1971 by Pablo Rodriguez, then acting as lawyer for Roberto Viaux. Its philosophy was based on national syndicalism, preaching the creation of a corporatist state under the control of an authoritarian government. It was, in other words, fascist. The Political Directorate of the group included the country's most powerful industrial and landed interest: Benjamin Matte, president of the National Society of Agriculture (SNA), Orlando Saenz, president of the National Society of Manufacturers (SOFOFA) and former economic advisor to the Junta, Horge Fortaine, president of the Confederation of Production and

Commerce, and a number of retired military leaders like Viaux and General Canales.

Patria y Libertad worked both publicly and clandestinely. The public side concentrated primarily on propaganda which was disseminated to a wide audience through a chain of radio stations headed by Radio Argicultura. These stations were used both to spread misinformation further contributing to the creation of chaos within the country and also to send out coded paramilitary messages.

The clandestine front involved paramilitary training, intelligence, infiltration and coordination with the *gremio* movement to organize strikes, sabotage and terrorist acts. This side of the organization was run similarly to early Nazi groups in Germany. To become a member the individual underwent an elaborate system of intelligence checks, indoctrination classes, training in arms and communications, and for the more proven cadre, classes on explosives and intelligence gathering. The military apparatus of *Patria y Libertad* was divided into cells—training squadrons, death squads, and shock troops. Ex-military officials, many graduates of the International Police Academy or the Army School of the Americas, gave the classes. In the fall of 1973, out of 201 students in the Army School of the Americas, 53 were Chilean. Now they are receiving courses in counterinsurgency rather than terrorist tactics.

With the success of the UP in the April 1971 municipal elections, *Patria y Libertad* went into action, and the US apparatus to support it was moved into place. One of the first changes was the replacement of US Ambassador Korry by Nathaniel Davis, an expert in the use of paramilitary forces.

An important element in US intelligence activities in foreign countries is always advice. Because of their vast experience in counterinsurgency and overthrowing governments, CIA men bring an important expertise to each new experience. They also bring the vast knowledge of the particular country, gathered over the years by their information gathering apparatus. US intelligence and paramilitary experts aided the Chilean right-wing in every way possible.

The CIA's in-country team in the US Embassy in Santiago maintained direct contact with *Patria y Libertad*. Ambassador Davis had frequent meetings with both Orlando Saenz and Pablo Rodriguez. Joseph Vasilie, using the well-known CIA cover of the US Office of Public Safety Advisor—the same cover used by Dan Mitrione in Uruguay—was finally expelled from Chile for his relations with *Patria y Libertad*. With his knowledge of paramilitary affairs and specific access to knowledge about the kinds of paramilitary equipment available from the United States, Vasilie was of great aid to the group.

In addition to contacts on an official level with the United States and with the Chilean community here, *Patria y Libertad* also began to set up an apparatus of support throughout Latin-America—in the strongholds of US imperialism. Brazil and Bolivia were particularly important, both countries having military dictatorships, installed after US-supported coup d'etats. Right-wing Brazilian groups, with close connections to the United States, offered \$8 million to *Patria y Libertad* and a force of some 500 men. Arms were also shipped in under cover of business transactions between the Brazilian and Chilean bourgeoisies. One important example of this was the numerous

shipments of arms which entered Chile in boxes of *Si Cafe*, a company owned by Pedro Ibanez.

Contacts for arms and money were also made with the right-wing in Argentina. The numerous CIA operatives working in Argentina were instrumental in shoring up this apparatus as well. Most importantly, the US Army base in Mendoza, Argentina (on the border with Chile) was used by the CIA as a cover for paramilitary operations. At the time of the coup in Chile, there were 22 US Air Force planes at the air base there, an inordinate amount.

Getting money and arms to paramilitary groups is something which the United States cannot do directly in the same manner in which they support fascist governments. When the Right is not in power, covert means must be created to support it. One of the ways this is done is through the use of "proprietarys"—front companies which act as funnels and covers for the Central Intelligence Agency. These fronts can be export/import companies, travel agencies, or small research companies, to name a few. One of the CIA's best known proprietary, was Southern Air Transport (SAT). In Victor Marchetti's words, SAT is, "the Agency's air arm for potential Latin American interventions." With Headquarters in Miami, SAT received its funds through a conduit called Actus Technology. Southern Air Transport was active in the Congo in 1961, in the Bay of Pigs, in Venezuela and in Bolivia. In 1971, SAT, began flying into Chile. When asked what they were unloading, SAT crew members answered "meat," not a well-known Chilean import from the United States at that time. Flights continued regularly until the time of the coup.

Patria y Libertad leader Roberto Thieme is led into court in August '72 following a two month manhunt. Thieme coordinated the importation of arms by way of the US Army Base in Mendoza, on the Chile/Argentina border.



Another means of getting arms into the country covertly is to use a US Army cover, and then simply redistribute the arms once they have entered. When not using this method, the CIA can also use private companies which are either CIA covers or which will be glad to work with the Agency for a price. The same is true of small teams of gun runners.

All of this equipment requires training and some sort of expertise. By the spring of 1973, terrorist activities had been escalated to a new high and included bombings, sabotage of electrical plants, highways, water systems, and attacks on the Left. As the terrorist acts became more serious and were used not only as propaganda—to create an atmosphere of chaos—but also to inflict real damage on the economy, a higher degree of skill was needed to carry them out. Michael Townley had that skill. Recruited when he was in the Peace Corps in Chile, Townley returned as an advisor for the CIA to work with *Patria y Libertad*. In early 1973, he and five members of a terror squad from the organization attacked the Electrical Service Center in Concepcion. They were trying to cut off UP government TV broadcasts to Concepcion by destroying one electrical component of a complex system. It was a highly technical job requiring both skill and good equipment. But the project failed. TV broadcasts to the city were only disrupted for a short time. Furthermore, the terror squad had hastily bound and gagged the night watchman at the center and he suffocated to death, creating tremendous public indignation against the attackers. Townley was picked up with the other five men but eventually fled to the United States.

Members of the US military also lent their expertise to the counter-revolution. In late May 1973 three staff members of the US Embassy met with officers of the Chilean Navy and Army on board Chilean naval vessels docked in the port of Arica. From that point on there was at least one US Naval Intelligence Officer on every major Chilean Navy ship. Finally, it was during this same period that a US Marine team from Panama visited Chile.


FUNDING

An essential requirement of these paramilitary activities—as well as the other varieties of subversion carried out by the Chilean right-wing—was funding. People working underground had to be supported. Those arms not donated by the United States and Brazil had to be purchased and radio stations had to be funded, all of which was expensive.

With the testimony of CIA director William Colby before the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Intelligence, we now know that the Forty Committee approved the expenditure of at the very least \$8 million for covert activities of the CIA between 1970 and 1973 in an effort to “destabilize” the UP government. Colby stated that the Forty Committee authorized the expenditure of \$1 million for “further political destabilization” in August 1973, just a month before the coup.

Seymour Hersh of the *New York Times* quoted “well informed sources” as saying that much of a chapter on Chile in Victor Marchetti’s book *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence* is a part of the material pre-censored by the courts. The CIA had requested the court order on the grounds of national security.

“As initially written,” the sources said, “the book’s chapter on Chile began with the following quote



Woodcut of Salvador Allende. Rodemor/LNS.

from Henry Kissinger, who was then serving as adviser on national security to President Richard Nixon.

“I don’t see why we need to stand by and watch a country go Communist due to the irresponsibility of its own people.”

The strength which the right-wing was able to maintain in Chile through the years of the UP Government facilitated its ability to use all sorts of conduits and engage almost openly in seditious activity. The class alliance forged many years before with the US imperialists gave it the strength necessary to regain power, at least in the short-run.

THE MEDIA

Propaganda, disseminated through what is called a media apparatus, is an important front in the ideological struggle. Ideological clarity helps to unite people and prepare them for the mass and armed struggle. Propaganda is used to shape people’s consciousness and incite them to action. The ruling class understands this very well. Ideological warfare is one of the battle fronts with imperialism.

Revolutions cannot succeed without the defeat and destruction of the reactionary forces. The Right was never defeated in Chile. They continued to wage an intensive ideological battle, with the aid of US imperialism, throughout the years of the UP government. This struggle took place on both a covert and an overt level. To the extent that the Left did not achieve ideological clarity and unity, the Right was able to make gains. To the extent that the Right maintained a solid economic base within the society and received



Striking truck owners gather around a "common pot" during one of their strikes which crippled the Chilean economy. The truckers' strike in August '73 is said to have cost nearly \$7 million, 35 thousand truckers were paid \$3-\$5 a day for 45 days.

the support of the United States they were able to continue these activities.

Just as the United States constructed the Organization of American States (OAS) in an attempt to politically control Latin America, and supports ORIT and AIFLD in order to spread bankrupt US labor ideology, so it has constructed an apparatus to attempt to control culture and ideology. The United States Information Agency (USIA), founded in 1953 at the height of the Cold War, is one of these overt mechanisms. One-quarter of USIA's world-wide budget was spent in Chile in 1961. USIA disseminated films to TV stations, tapes to radio stations, editorials to newspapers and magazines and a host of miscellaneous reactionary propaganda. Much of this propaganda was used during Frei's campaign in 1964. During the 1970-73 period, USIA continued to distribute its material to the right-wing media, in particular Channel 13-TV (The Catholic University's station)

and *El Mercurio*, the right wing daily newspaper.

The Inter-American Press Association (IAPA) is another tentacle of US imperialism in Latin America. IAPA's vice president, until 1972, was Agustin Edwards. He was replaced by Rene Silva Espejo, president of *El Mercurio*. The Board of Directors of IAPA—which was long ago denounced as a CIA front—is heavily dominated by the major media interests in the United States including representatives of both the Hearst and Knight chain of papers, and TV and radio stations. IAPA held its annual convention in Santiago in 1972 and used that forum to mount attacks on the UP government and give the right-wing credibility. In a fitting move, IAPA gave its annual award that year to Jorge Fontaine, an editor of *El Mercurio*.

US advertising agencies also played an important role, particularly the agency which was crucial during the coup in Brazil in 1964. Marplan, the Latin American division of McCann Erickson, orchestrated a cam-

campaign against nationalization which included both printed matter and films which were shown in mothers' centers and the *juntas de vecinos* (neighborhood centers). The objectives of the plan are stated most concisely in Marplan's own description: "It is necessary to destroy the image of the State as patron; it is necessary to stimulate the sense of property among workers, a feeling which already has been shown among the peasants. . ."

In addition, there are several forms of covert activities which relate to the media: "disinformation," black propaganda, coded communications and incitement to counter-revolutionary activity. All were used in Chile.

1. Black propaganda is the dissemination of false information meant to influence people's opinions and move them to action. Overseen by the Covert Action Staff of Clandestine Services and using the skills of sociologists, psychologists, historians and media specialists, these CIA experts have long practiced this art. The CIA has been caught disseminating false Tupamaro documents, redesigning OSPAAAL posters to make it look like leftist parties are fighting among themselves, and forging numerous varieties of documents. In Chile, black propaganda took many forms. One use was in the creation of shortages. Right-wing radio stations would broadcast alarms saying that the supply of one item or another was running out. People would dash from their houses and buy up large quantities of the item so as to have a supply. In reality this would create the shortage.

2. "Disinformation" is the subtle distortion of reality. The right-wing press practices this daily. For example, in 1973 reactionary papers furiously attacked the UP for proposing a restructuring of the education system known as the *Escuela Nacional Unificada* (ENU). As the reporting grew stronger, reactionary secondary school children held a demonstration on the steps of the National Library of Santiago and proceeded to run through the streets of Santiago, breaking store windows, setting fires, and overturning cars. All of this to protest the government's educational plan. In reality, however, the plan had been withdrawn weeks before, but this was not reported in the papers.

El Mercurio, the newspaper of the Edwards which was managed by Rene Silva Espejo—one of the founders of the Chilean Nazi Party—was a key part of the campaign of disinformation. As such, it was aided by CIA agents placed on the paper's staff. Alvaro Puga, one such agent, was in charge of the propaganda campaigns of the paper. He was also a conduit for the placing of stories written by the CIA experts back in

the States. Puga eventually achieved such success at his job that he became a member of the reactionary Central Operative Command which directed the coup d'état.

3. Incitement to action. The CIA usually reaches its propagandistic heights with the founding of a so-called *Radio Liberacion* similar to the one which was so totally unsuccessful during the Bay of Pigs invasion. Once again, Michael Townley, Peace-Corpsman-turned-CIA-paramilitary-expert, was the protagonist of this activity in Chile. The first attempt at founding an anti-government *Radio Liberacion* occurred during the October 1972 strike by the *gremios*. Townley, with the aid of Manuel Fuentes, began broadcasting—with the use of highly sophisticated equipment—a plan for the overthrow of the government. While the plan was not successful at the time, Townley gained some experience which he would put to use later.

4. Coded messages were consistently broadcast over right-wing radio stations throughout the years of the UP government. In the early days messages were quite simple. For example, right-wing radios contacted networks of reactionary women over the air to advise them where they could obtain scarce goods so that they could supply themselves and help create further shortages. As the time passed and the level of class struggle increased, messages took on more of a tactical and paramilitary nature. Roberto Thieme's illegal re-entry into Chile was broadcast in a code as well as Pinochet's incorporation into the counter-revolution.

CONCLUSION

US imperialism is on the defensive. It cannot defend all of its empire militarily; it must use other means. In South America, in particular, the form of warfare is covert. We have lived through military coups in Guatemala, Brazil, Bolivia, Uruguay and now Chile. But the war continues.

Like any other battle, covert warfare embodies a strategy and tactics; to defeat it we must begin to understand both better. This study was done to try and delineate some of the strategies and tactics of US imperialism: we study history to understand the present so that we can shape the future.

The Vietnamese describe US imperialism as a wounded tiger which is being defeated but is, nevertheless, all the more ferocious in its dying stage. This ferociousness is being unleashed in Latin America and around the world daily. But the people are gaining strength and will defeat it. *La Resistencia Va!*

Published By:

New England Free Press
60 Union Square
Somerville, Mass. 02143

