

81-7.210

MAOIST AND CAPITALIST ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

By John Gurley



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This is an abridgement of an article which is scheduled to appear in Mark Selden and Edward Friedman, eds., *America's Asia* (Pantheon Books), on March 22. Because of MR's limited space we asked and received permission from the author to summarize the introduction and first two sections (entitled "Some Common Elements" and "Capitalist Economic Development"). Professor Gurley's text proper begins under the heading "Maoist Economic Development" on page 17 below.—The Editors

1. Capitalist and Maoist conceptions of economic development have elements in common, but their differences are many and profound. American economists assume as a matter of course that the capitalist way is superior. As a consequence they have produced studies of Chinese development which lack insight and are generally unsatisfactory.

2. There is a core of development theory which would probably be accepted by both sides. It deals with such concepts as national output, consumption, and investment. Investment adds to capital stock and makes possible larger output in the future. Other determinants of the size of output are the availability of other inputs: labor, land, and natural resources. What counts generally is not total output but output per capita. This can be raised by increasing capital faster than labor and by improving the quality of both capital and labor.

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3. Thus if an economy wishes to increase its output per capita, the most promising avenues to success are large investment programs; expenditures for research and development to stimulate rapid technological advance; investment in human beings by way of health, education, and in-training programs; and efforts to improve organization and management methods.

4. Capitalist theory holds that an economy can develop most rapidly under a regime of competitive private enterprise, division of labor, and material incentives. These are the means to attain the goal of more and more output. Implicit in this theory is the view that man is mainly an input, a factor of production, a means to an end.

5. Actual capitalist development has never conformed very closely with the theory, but nevertheless it has been successful in raising living standards for large numbers of people; it has been relatively efficient in using factors of production in ways best designed to maximize the output that consumers have by and large demanded; and it has encouraged innovative activity and technological advances.

6. At the same time capitalist development has always been uneven in crucially important ways—in its alternating periods of boom and bust; in enriching some people thousands of times more than others; in developing production facilities with much more care than it has devoted to the welfare of human beings and their environment; in fostering lopsided development both within individual countries and between advanced and underdeveloped countries.

7. Much of this lopsided development is intimately connected with the profit motive. The key link is the fact that it is almost always most profitable to build on the best. Thus a businessman locates a factory in a city alongside existing ones rather than in the country, to gain access to supplies, skilled labor, and high-income consumers; to maximize profits, he hires the best, most qualified workers; a banker extends loans to those who are already successful; an educational system devotes its best efforts to the superior students; promoters locate cultural centers amidst urbanites best able to appreciate and pay for them; the most profitable business firms attract the best workers and have easiest access to loanable funds; satellite capitalist

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countries, in the interests of efficiency and comparative advantage, are induced to specialize in cocoa or peanuts or coffee—to build on what they have always done best.

This pursuit of efficiency and private profits through building on the best has led in some areas to impressive aggregate growth rates, but almost everywhere in the international capitalist world it has favored only a relatively few at the expense of the many, and in poor capitalist countries it has left most in stagnant backwaters. Capitalist development, even when most successful, is always a trickle-down development.

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The Maoists' disagreement with the capitalist view of economic development is profound. Their emphases, values, and aspirations are quite different from those of capitalist economists. To begin with, Maoist economic development occurs within the context of central planning, public ownership of industries, and agricultural cooperatives or communes. While decision-making is decentralized to some extent, decisions regarding investment vs. consumption, foreign trade, allocation of material inputs and some labor supply, prices of goods and factors—these and more are essentially in the hands of the state. The profit motive is officially discouraged from assuming an important role in the allocation of resources, and material incentives, while still prevalent, are downgraded.

But perhaps the most striking difference between the capitalist and Maoist views is in regard to goals. Maoists believe that, while a principal aim of nations should be to raise the level of material welfare of the population, this should be done only within the context of the development of human beings and of encouraging them to realize fully their manifold creative powers. And it should be done only on an egalitarian basis—that is, on the basis that development is not worth much unless everyone rises together. No one is to be left behind, either economically or culturally. Indeed, Maoists believe that rapid economic development is not likely to occur *unless* everyone rises together. Development as a trickle-down process is therefore rejected by Maoists, and, as a consequence, they reject any strong emphasis on profit motives and efficiency criteria that

lead to lopsided growth. Their emphasis, in short, is on man rather than on "things."^{1*}

A. Emphasis on Man

In Maoist eyes, economic development can best be attained by giving prominence to man. "In building up the . . . country, we—unlike the modern revisionists who one-sidedly stress the material factor, mechanization, and modernization—pay chief attention to the revolutionization of man's thinking and, through this command, guide and promote the work of mechanization and modernization."² The Maoists' stress on this point most sharply distinguishes their thinking on the subject of economic development from that of capitalist economists. For Maoists, correct ideas can be transformed into a tremendous material force to push socialist construction to ever-higher levels. "Once Mao Tse-tung's thought is grasped by the broad masses, it will become an inexhaustible source of strength and an infinitely powerful spiritual atom bomb."³ If, on the other hand, one concentrates on machinery, techniques, and things, economic development will proceed at a snail's pace. There can be big leaps forward only by putting man at the center, and so releasing his huge reservoir of energy, creativity, and wisdom, which up to now have been submerged by bourgeois society and by the ideas and behavior patterns it generates.

Capitalist economists have recently stressed the importance for economic growth of "investment in human capital"—that is, investment in general education, job training, and better health. It has been claimed that expenditures in these directions have had a large "payoff" in terms of output growth. The Maoists' emphasis, however, is quite different. First of all, while they recognize the key role played by education and health in the production process, their emphasis is heavily on the transformation of ideas, the making of the communist man. Ideology, of course, may be considered as part of education in the broadest sense, but it is surely not the part that capitalist economists have in mind when they evaluate education's contribution to economic growth. Moreover, ideological training does not in-

* Numbered notes will be found at the end of the article.

clude the acquisition of particular skills, or the training of specialists—as education and job training in capitalist countries tend to do. The Maoists believe that economic development can best be promoted by breaking down specialization, by dismantling bureaucracies, and by undermining the other centralizing and divisive tendencies that give rise to experts, technicians, authorities, and bureaucrats remote from or manipulating “the masses.” Finally, Maoists seem perfectly willing to pursue the goal of transforming man even though it is temporarily at the expense of some economic growth.⁴ Indeed, it is clear that Maoists will not accept economic development, however rapid, if it is based on the capitalist principles of sharp division of labor and sharp (unsavory, selfish) practices.

B. The Making of Communist Man

The proletarian world view,⁵ which Maoists believe must replace that of the bourgeoisie, stresses that only through struggle can progress be made; that selflessness and unity of purpose will release a huge reservoir of enthusiasm, energy, and creativeness; that active participation by “the masses” in decision-making will provide them with the knowledge to channel their energy most productively; and that the elimination of specialization will not only increase workers’ and peasants’ willingness to work hard for the various goals of society but will also increase their ability to do this by adding to their knowledge and awareness of the world around them.

Struggle—It is an essential part of Maoist thinking that progress is not made by peace and quietude, by letting things drift and playing things safe, or by standing for “unprincipled peace, thus giving rise to a decadent, philistine attitude. . . .”⁶ Progress is made through struggle, when new talents emerge and knowledge advances in leaps. Only through continuous struggle is the level of consciousness of people raised, and in the process they gain not only understanding but happiness.

Mao sees man engaged in a fierce class struggle—the bourgeoisie against the proletariat—the outcome of which, at least in the short run, is far from certain. The proletarian world outlook can win only if it enters tremendous, ideological, class struggles.

In China, although in the main socialist transformation has been completed with respect to the system of ownership, and although the large-scale and turbulent class struggles of the masses characteristic of the previous revolutionary periods have in the main come to an end, there are still remnants of the overthrown landlord and comprador classes, there is still a bourgeoisie, and the remolding of the petty bourgeoisie has only just started. The class struggle is by no means over. The class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, the class struggle between the different political forces, and the class struggle in the ideological field between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie will continue to be long and tortuous and at times will even become very acute. The proletariat seeks to transform the world according to its own world outlook, and so does the bourgeoisie. In this respect, the question of which will win out, socialism or capitalism, is still not really settled.⁷

Selflessness—Maoists believe that each person should be devoted to "the masses" rather than to his own pots and pans, and should serve the world proletariat rather than reaching out with "grasping hands everywhere to seek fame, material gain, power, position, and limelight."⁸ They think that, if a person is selfish, he will resist criticism and suggestions and is likely to become bureaucratic and elitist. He will work harder for narrow, selfish goals than he will for group, community, or national goals. In any case, a selfish person is not an admirable person. Thus, Maoists de-emphasize material incentives, for they are the very manifestation of a selfish, bourgeois society.

Active Participation—While selflessness is necessary to imbue man with energy and the *willingness* to work hard, this is not sufficient, for man must also have the *ability* as well. And such ability comes from active participation—from seeing and doing. As Mao has written in a famous essay:

If you want to know a certain thing or a certain class of things directly, you must personally participate in the practical struggle to change reality, to change that thing or class of things, for only thus can you come into contact with them as phenomena; only through personal participation in the practical struggle to change reality can you uncover the essence of that thing or class of things and comprehend them. . . . If you want knowledge, you must take part in the practice of changing reality. If you want to know the taste of a pear, you must change the pear by eating it yourself. . . . All genuine knowledge originates in direct experi-

ence. . . . There is an old Chinese saying, "How can you catch tiger cubs without entering the tiger's lair?" This saying holds true for man's practice and it also holds true for the theory of knowledge. There can be no knowledge apart from practice.⁹

To gain knowledge, people must be awakened from their half-slumber, encouraged to mobilize themselves and to take conscious action to elevate and liberate themselves. When they actively participate in decision-making, when they take an interest in state affairs, when they dare to do new things, when they become good at presenting facts and reasoning things out, when they criticize and test and experiment scientifically—having discarded myths and superstitions, when they are aroused—then "the socialist initiative latent in the masses [will] burst out with volcanic force and a rapid change [will take] place in production."¹⁰

I noted above that both attributes of selflessness and active participation were necessary for the making of the communist man. For a selfish person, who has nevertheless become fully aware and knowledgeable through correctly combining theory and practice, will be given to sharp practices for his own ends and will become bureaucratic and divorced from the masses. A passive, unknowing person who has nevertheless become selfless, will be well-meaning but largely ineffective, for he will not be able to use his energies productively. In fact, it is likely that in the long run "selfless" and "active" cannot exist separately, only together. If one is not active, he will eventually revert to selfish behavior; if one is selfish, he will eventually become passive, bureaucratic, and unable to gain true knowledge.¹¹

Finally, if men become "selfless," there will be discipline and unity of will, for these "cannot be achieved if relations among comrades stem from selfish interests and personal likes and dislikes."¹² If men become "active," then along with extensive democracy they will gain true consciousness and ultimately freedom, in the Marxian sense of intelligent action.¹³ Together, selflessness and active participation will achieve ideal combinations of opposites: "A vigorous and lively political situation . . . is taking shape throughout our country, in which there is both centralism and democracy, both discipline and freedom, both unity of will and personal ease of mind."¹⁴

rather than lopsided growth. If Maoism were only that, we could simply state that, while Maoist development may be much more equitable than capitalist efforts, it is surely less efficient and thus less rapid; efficiency is being sacrificed to some extent for equity. But that would miss the more important aspects of Maoist ideology, which holds that the resources devoted to bringing everyone into the socialist development process—the effort spent on building on “the worst”—will eventually pay off not only in economic ways by enormously raising labor productivity but, more important, by creating a society of truly free men, who respond intelligently to the world around them, and who are happy.¹⁸

U.S. STUDIES OF CHINESE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

The sharp contrast between the economic development views of capitalist economists and those of the Chinese Communists cannot be denied; their two worlds are quite different. The difference is not mainly between being Chinese and being American, although that is surely part of it, but rather between being Maoists in a Marxist-Leninist tradition and being present-day followers of the economics first fashioned by Adam Smith and later reformed by J. M. Keynes. Whatever the ignorance and misunderstanding on the Chinese side regarding the doctrines of capitalist economics, it is clear that many Western economic experts on China have shown little interest in, and almost no understanding of, Maoist economic development. Most of the economic researchers have approached China as though it was little more than a series of tables in a Yearbook which could be analyzed by Western economic methods and judged by capitalist values. The result has been a series of unilluminating studies, largely statistical or institutional in method, and lacking analysis of the really distinctive and interesting features of Maoist development.*

Economic research on China suffers from an ailment com-

* The full text of Professor Gurley's paper includes at this point a listing, with brief commentaries, of some dozen books on China by Western economists.—Ed.

mon to most of economics—a narrow empiricism. Thus, most of the research studies of the Chinese economy deal with very small segments of the development process, and within these tiny areas the researchers busy themselves with data series—adding up the numbers, adjusting them in numerous ways, deflating them for price changes, and doing a lot of other fussy statistical work. Each economist tills intensively his small plot, gaining highly specialized knowledge in the process, finally ending up an expert in his cramped quarters. There are not many economists in the China field who try to see Chinese economic development as a whole, as “the comprehensive totality of the historical process.” If the truth is the whole, as Hegel claimed, most economic experts on China must be so far from the truth that it is hardly worthwhile listening to them.

Moreover, it is often painful. Even a casual reader of the economic research on Communist China cannot help but notice that many of the researchers are not happy—to say the least—with the object of their investigation. This catches one’s attention right away because it is so very unusual in economics. Ordinarily economists are utterly fascinated and almost in love with their special areas of study—even with such an esoteric one as “Game Theory Applied to Nonlinear Development.” But not so our China experts! Indeed, it is quite apparent that many of them consider China to be, not The Beloved, but The Enemy. And in dealing with The Enemy, their research often reveals very strong biases against China.

These biases show up in a variety of ways, from such trivial things as changing Peking to Peiping (à la Dean Rusk), which reveals a wish that the communists weren’t there; to the frequent use of emotive words (e.g., the communists are not dedicated but “obsessed”; leaders are “bosses”; a decision not to release data is described as “a sullen statistical silence”; the extension of the statistical system becomes “an extension of its tentacles farther into the economy”); to the attribution of rather sinister motives to ordinary economic and cultural policies (e.g., education and literacy are promoted for the purpose of spreading evil Marxian doctrines; economic development is pursued for the principal purpose of gaining military strength for geographical expansion—which is the theme of W. W. Rostow’s

In education, there has been a major breakthrough. All urban children and a great majority of rural children have attended primary schools, and enrollments in secondary schools and in higher education are large, in proportion to the population, compared with pre-communist days. If "school" is extended in meaning to include these as well as part-time, part-study education, spare-time education, and study groups organized by the communes, factories, street organizations, the army—then there are schools everywhere in China; then China may be said to be just one great big school.

China's gains in the medical and public health fields are perhaps the most impressive of all. The gains are attested to by many recent visitors to China. For example, a Canadian doctor a few years ago visited medical colleges, hospitals, and research institutes, and everywhere he found good equipment, high medical standards, excellent medical care; almost all comparable to Canadian standards.²⁰ A member of the U.S. Public Health Service stated a few years ago that "the prevention and control of many infections and parasitic diseases which have ravaged [China] for generations" was a "most startling accomplishment." He noted, too, that "the improvement of general environmental sanitation and the practice of personal hygiene, both in the cities and in the rural areas, was also phenomenal."²¹

While all these gains were being made, the Chinese have devoted an unusually large amount of resources to industrial output. China's industrial production has risen on the average by at least 11 percent per year since 1950, which is an exceptionally high growth rate for an underdeveloped country. And industrial progress is not likely to be retarded in the future by any lack of natural resources, for China is richly endowed and is right now one of the four top producers in the world of coal, iron ore, mercury, tin, tungsten, magnesite, salt, and antimony. In recent years, China has made large gains in the production of coal, iron, and steel, chemical fertilizers, and oil. In fact, since the huge discoveries at the Tach'ing oilfield, China is now self-sufficient in oil and has offered to export some to Japan.

From the industrial, agricultural, and other gains I have outlined, I would estimate that China's real GNP has risen

on the average by at least 6 percent per year since 1949, or by at least 4 percent on a per capita basis. This may not seem high, but it is a little better than the Soviet Union did over a comparable period (1928-1940), much better than England's record during her century of industrialization (1750-1850) when her income per capita grew at one-half of one percent per year, perhaps a bit better than Japan's performance from 1878 to 1936, certainly much superior to France's one percent record from 1800 to 1870, far better than India's 1.3 percent growth during 1950 to 1967, and much superior to the post-war record of almost all underdeveloped countries in the world.

This is a picture of an economy richly endowed with natural resources, but whose people are still very poor, making substantial gains in industrialization, moving ahead more slowly in agriculture, raising education and health levels dramatically, turning out increasing numbers of scientists and engineers, expanding the volume of foreign trade and the variety of products traded, and making startling progress in the development of nuclear weapons. This is a truer picture, I believe, than the bleak one drawn by some of our China experts.²²

The failure of many economic experts on China to tell the story of her economic development accurately and fully is bad enough. But even worse, I think, has been the general failure to deal with China on her own terms, within the framework of her own goals and methods for attaining those goals, or even to recognize the possible validity of those goals. Communist China is certainly not a paradise, but it is now engaged in perhaps the most interesting economic and social experiment ever attempted, in which tremendous efforts are being made to achieve an egalitarian development, an industrial development without dehumanization, one that involves everyone and affects everyone. But all those efforts seem not to have affected Western economists, who have gone ahead with their income accounts and slide-rules, and their free-enterprise values, to measure and judge. One of the most revealing developments in the China field is the growing belief among the economic experts that further research is hardly worthwhile in view of the small amount of economic statistics that have come out of China since 1958. Apparently it does not matter that 775 million people are

involved in a gigantic endeavor to change their environment, their economic and social institutions, their standard of living, and themselves; that never before have such potentially important economic and social experiments been carried out; that voluminous discussions of these endeavors by the Maoists are easily available. No, if GNP data are not forthcoming, if numbers can't be added up and adjusted, then the economy is hardly worth bothering about!

SOME SUGGESTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

What can be done? Probably not very much until a substantial number of younger economists becomes interested in China. It is a hopeful sign that many young economists are now breaking away from the stultifying atmosphere of present-day "neo-classical" economics and are trying to refashion the discipline into political economy—as it once was—so as to take account of the actual world and not the world of highly abstract models, scholastic debates, and artificial assumptions—all designed to justify the existing state of things and to accept, without question, the rather narrow, materialistic goals of capitalist society. This reformulation by the young will have to take place first, but once this task is well along, China is bound to be attractive to many of these "new" economists. Only then will we begin to get a substantial amount of research on China that makes sense.

The research that would make sense is any that takes Maoism seriously as a model of economic development, in terms both of its objectives and of the means employed to attain those objectives. A thoughtful consideration of Maoism means paying proper attention to Marxism-Leninism as well as the Chinese past of the Maoists. The Marxist-Leninist goal of the communist man within a classless society in which each person works according to his ability and consumes according to his needs—this goal of the Maoists should be taken seriously in any economic analysis of what is now going on.

I mentioned earlier, when discussing the core of development theory that would probably be accepted by both the capitalist and Maoist sides, that economic growth can be at-

tained by increasing the amounts of labor, capital goods, and land used in production, by improving the quality of these factors of production, by combining them in more efficient ways and inspiring labor to greater efforts, and by taking advantage of economies of scale. Now Maoism undoubtedly affects every one of these ingredients of economic growth, and often in ways quite different from the capitalist impact. For example, it is likely that Maoist ideology discourages consumption and encourages saving and investment, and so promotes the growth of the capital stock; and does this by preventing the rise of a high-consuming "middle class," by fostering the Maoist virtues of plain and simple living and devoting one's life to helping others rather than to accumulating "pots and pans."

As another example, it is possible that Maoist economic development, by de-emphasizing labor specialization and reliance on experts and technicians, reduces the quality of the labor force and so slows the rate of economic growth. On the other hand, as Adam Smith once suggested, labor specialization, while increasing productivity in some narrow sense, is often at the expense of the worker's general intelligence and understanding. For the "man whose whole life is spent in performing a few simple operations . . . generally becomes as stupid and ignorant as it is possible for a human creature to become."²⁸ The difference between the most dissimilar of human beings, according to Smith, is not so much the cause of division of labor as it is the effect of it. Consequently, while an economy might gain from the division of labor in some small sense, it could lose in the larger sense of creating men who are little more than passive and unreasoning robots. A major aim of the Maoists is to transform man from this alienated state into a fully aware and participating member of society. The emphasis on "reds" rather than experts is just one part of this transformation which, it is felt, will release "an atom bomb" of talents and energy and enable labor productivity to take great leaps.

In addition to this argument, which is based on Maoist interpretation of their own history and experience, particularly during the Yen-an period, it is also possible that the "universal man" in an underdeveloped economy would provide more flexibility to the economy. If most people could perform many jobs

moderately well, manual and intellectual, urban and rural, the economy might be better able to cope with sudden and large changes; it could with little loss in efficiency mobilize its labor force for a variety of tasks. Further, since experience in one job carries over to others, a person may be almost as productive, in the job-proficiency sense, in any one of them as he would be if he specialized in it. A peasant who has spent some months in a factory can more easily repair farm equipment, and so on. Finally, a Maoist economy may generate more useful information than a specialist one and so lead to greater creativity and productivity. When each person is a narrow specialist, communication among such people is not highly meaningful—your highly specialized knowledge means little to me in my work. When, on the other hand, each person has basic knowledge about many lines of activity, the experiences of one person enrich the potentialities of many others.

The point is that this topic—which, I should stress, includes not only labor productivity, that is the development of material things by human beings, but also the development of human beings themselves—this topic of generalists vs. specialists, reds vs. experts, the masses vs. bureaucrats, or whatever, is not a foolish one to be laughed away, as it has been in effect by some China experts. How men in an industrial society should relate to machines and to each other in seeking happiness and real meaning in their lives has surely been one of the most important problems of the modern age. There is also another basic issue here: whether modern industrial society, capitalist or socialist, does in fact diminish man's essential powers, his capacity for growth in many dimensions, even though it does allocate him "efficiently" and increase his skills as a specialized input. Is man Lockean in nature, reactive to outside forces, adjusting passively to disequilibrium forces from without? Or is he essentially Leibnizian, the source of acts, active, capable of growth, and having an inner being that is self-propelled? If the latter, how are these powers released?

The Maoists claim that the powers exist and can be released. If they are right, the implications for economic development are so important that it would take a bunch of absolute dunces on this side of the Pacific to ignore them.

NOTES

1. This has been expressed by Maoists in many ways. As Mao Tse-tung has put it: "Of all things in the world, people are the most precious." ("The Bankruptcy of the Idealist Conception of History," in *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Vol. IV, p. 454) The *Peking Review* adds: "Whatever we do, we give prominence to the factor of man and put man at the center." (November 11, 1966, pp. 19-20) And: "Chairman Mao's teaching to 'be resolute, fear no sacrifice and surmount every difficulty to win victory' means, in the last analysis, to give emphasis to the human factor." (*Ibid.*, March 17, 1967, p. 12) With regard to national defense, Lin Piao has stated: "For our armed forces, the best weapon is not aircraft, heavy artillery, tanks or the atom bomb. It is Mao Tse-tung's thought. The greatest fighting power is the men who are armed with Mao Tse-tung's thought." (Quoted in *Peking Review*, March 17, 1967, pp. 12-13) Mao has expressed the same idea: "Weapons are an important factor in war, but not the decisive factor; it is people, not things, that are decisive." ("On Protracted War," in *Selected Works*, Vol. II, pp. 143-144)
2. Mao Tse-tung, quoted in *Peking Review*, November 11, 1966, pp. 19-20.
3. *Peking Review*, December 23, 1966, p. 7.
4. For 3,000 years the Chinese have paid much more attention to human relations than to conquering nature. Mao Tse-tung, as a Chinese and as a Marxist, cannot help but follow in this tradition. But, as a Chinese, he wishes to make China powerful in the eyes of the world, and, as a Marxist, through socialism. The world views power in terms of GNP and nuclear weapons, not in terms of perfection in human relations. So Mao has to go both directions at the same time, and the two goals often conflict with one another, at least in the short run.

This conflict was especially prominent in the latter half of the nineteenth century when some Chinese advocated using Western techniques but retaining Chinese culture and human relations. At that time and later, the adoption of Western techniques subverted Chinese culture. This conflict can perhaps be stated in terms of the "quantity of life" vs. the "quality of life."

Mao, of course, does not wish to preserve the "old ways," but he is interested in "man" and in human relations in an industrial society. Thus, just like his nineteenth-century predecessors, Mao is faced with the conflict between developing "good" human beings and attaining rapid economic development.

5. Mao Tse-tung follows Marxism-Leninism in adopting the world outlook of dialectical materialism, which is a philosophy of human and natural change and interaction. Changes in society, for example, according to Mao, are not due chiefly to external causes but to internal ones—to the internal contradictions between the productive forces and the relations of production, between classes, etc. There is internal contradiction in every single thing, and it is the development of the contradiction that gives rise to changes—eventually to

qualitative changes. External causes by themselves could explain only changes in quantity or scale, but they could not explain qualitative or "leap" changes. The development of things should be seen as their internal and necessary self-movement, while each thing in its movement is interrelated with and interacts on the things around it." See Mao Tse-tung, "On Contradiction," *Selected Works*, Vol. I, p. 313.

6. Mao Tse-tung, "Combat Liberalism," *Selected Works*, Vol. II, p. 31.
7. Mao Tse-tung, "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People," in *Quotations of Mao Tse-tung*, pp. 17-18.
8. *Peking Review*, March 10, 1967, p. 22.
9. Mao Tse-tung, "On Practice," *Selected Works*, Vol. I, pp. 299-300. Mao holds to the dialectical-materialist theory of knowledge, the theory of unity of knowing and doing—theory and practice. He believes that truth can be discovered by starting from perceptual knowledge, actively developing it into rational knowledge, and then going out into the world of revolutionary practice to test the knowledge. "Practice, knowledge, again practice, and again knowledge. This form repeats itself in endless cycles, and with each cycle the content of practice and knowledge rises to a higher level." (*Ibid.*, p. 308)
10. *Peking Review*, February 24, 1967, p. 22.
11. Lenin implies that to reach the Marxian goal—"from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs"—people will have to become selfless and highly productive. If each person is to take freely according to his needs, he cannot be selfish. If there is to be enough for everyone, people will have to be highly productive. The latter is achieved by active participation, by seeing and doing, by theory and practice. See V. I. Lenin, "The State and Revolution," in *Selected Works* (International Publishers, 1967), Vol. 2, pp. 340-341.
12. *Peking Review*, January 6, 1967, p. 13.
13. Marxian freedom is real knowledge of a subject, intelligent action. A free individual "is no longer history's pawn, no longer condemned by the blind mechanics of social and economic forces to the mere suffering of history, but one who is a maker of history, who, knowing the nature of these forces, becomes, by choice and action, a part of them, thus changing them, and changing, too, himself, thus guiding both along those paths where each may live its fullest fruitfulness and history becomes at last appropriate to the best that human nature can become." (Vernon Venable, *Human Nature, The Marxian View*, p. 204)
14. *Peking Review*, December 23, 1966, p. 21.
15. Vernon Venable sums up the position of Marx and Engels on this point when he writes that "forcing men into a specialization of function that becomes more and more narrow, less and less interesting, less and less inclusive of his various potentials of ability, . . . has had the effect of stunting him, dehumanizing him, reducing him to a mere fragment of a man, a crippled monstrosity, an appendage to a machine." (Venable, *op. cit.*, pp. 123-124) For further views by Marx on specialization, see *The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, pp. 110, 161; *Capital* (Modern Library), pp. 397-98.

Marx saw a better day when each man could pursue not any one occupation but a variety of activities. Now a crippled fragment, man should become "the fully developed individual . . . to which the different social functions he performs are but so many modes of giving free scope to his own natural and acquired powers." (*Capital*, p. 534)

16. Quoted in Maurice Meisner, *Ascetic Values and Utopian Goals in Chinese Communist Ideology* (Mimeo., May 1967), p. 76.
17. *Ibid.*, pp. 77-78.
18. This emphasis on man was expressed by Marx in many ways, including the following: "A critique of religion leads to the doctrine that the highest being for man is man himself, hence to the categorical imperative to overthrow all relationships in which man is humbled, enslaved, abandoned, despised." (Quoted in Alfred G. Meyer, *Marxism: The Unity of Theory and Practice*, p. 51) Or, as Friedrich Engels saw man in the new society: "Man, at last the master of his own form of social organization, becomes at the same time the lord over nature, his own master—free." (Friedrich Engels, "Socialism, Utopian and Scientific," in W. O. Henderson, ed., *Engels: Selected Writings*, p. 225) The aim of socialism, for Marx, was not the production of more things but the self-realization of man. "It is easy to forget," Marx wrote, "that the production of too many useful things results in too many useless people." (Karl Marx, *The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, p. 151) This humanist strain, this dislike of anything that makes man a mere fragment of himself, runs through all of Marx's writings. "Marx is thoroughly and consistently humanist. A positive image of man, of what man might come to be, lies under every line of his analysis of what he held to be an inhuman society." (C. Wright Mills, *The Marxists*, p. 25)
19. Much of the material in this paragraph was suggested by John Despres, but he is not responsible for my interpretations of his remarks.
20. G. Leslie Willcox, "Observations on Medical Practices," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, June, 1966, p. 52. See also William Y. Chen, "Medicine and Public Health," in *Sciences in Communist China*, pp. 384, 397-399.
21. Chen, *op. cit.*
22. The above account of China's recent economic progress is largely taken from my testimony before the Joint Economic Committee. See *Mainland China in the World Economy, Hearings*, JEC, April 5, 10, 11, and 12, 1967, pp. 184-188.
23. Adam Smith, *The Wealth of Nations*, Book V, Ch. I, Part III.



Published by
New England Free Press
60 Union Square
Somerville, Mass. 02143

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