

Tabitha Petran

Israel is generally viewed in Western countries as a small, innocent, struggling nation beset on all sides by hostile Arab neighbors; a place of refuge for the persecuted Jews of the world. This myth has been purposely nourished by the Zionist forces, which in fact created the State of Israel primarily through military occupation and the forced eviction of the masses of the indigenous Arab population.

So successful have the Zionists been at propagating their concept of the historical evolution of Israel, that a significant portion of the progressive forces of the

world have been split over the question of the Arab-Israeli hostilities.

The history of Zionism is not a pretty one. Originally working hand-in-hand with Britain to assure a foothold for British imperialism in the Middle East, and later supported by and serving the economic, political, and military interests of US imperialism, Zionism propounded essentially the same line as the Nazis before and during Hitler's reign of terror against the Jewish population of Europe: that of the inability of Jews to be assimilated into other cultures.

The racist exclusionism of the Zionists continued within the state they had formed by driving out the Arabs. Those Arabs who remained were denied all political and economic rights within Zionist-dominated areas, which were constantly expanding. The Zionists built a powerful military machine, and increasingly attacked their vastly overpowered Arab neighbors, seizing land and property with each new attack and disregarding all aspects of international law, UN resolutions and the various agreements they themselves affirmed

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In her well-documented historical analysis of events in Palestine, Tabitha Petran — an American Jewish writer, who is in no sense anti-Semitic — destroys the myths that have been created about the State of Israel and the supposed

"aggressions" of the Arab states.

THE ARAB case on Palestine is straightforward and obvious. It is understood and supported by colonial liberation movements everywhere. Few in the West ever bother to think about it, and an extraordinary double standard prevails. It is not difficult to imagine the reaction of Western opinion if in the June 1967 war the roles of Israel and the Arabs had been reversed, if the Arab states had made a blitzkrieg attack on Israel, if Arab armies had forcibly evicted Israelis from homes and land in Israel as the Israeli Army ruthlessly evicted Arabs from their homes and lands in occupied Jordan, Syria, Gaza, Sinai, and has continued to do ever since.

Let us suppose that Israel was established by agreed decision, that it accepted as final the frontiers laid down by this decision, that the grave injury inflicted on the indigenous Palestine Arab population had been recognized and some compensation offered. This would have been asking of the Palestine Arabs, still more than two thirds the population after half a century of Zionist colonization, an unprecedented sacrifice. Yet perhaps some accommodation could have been reached. At the least the history of the past two decades would have

been very different.

For none of these suppositions

have a basis in reality.

—Israel was established not by agreed decision but by force, as Israeli leaders are the first to proclaim in boasting that they owe nothing to the UN, and in violating virtually every one of the many UN resolutions applying to

the Palestine question. 1

—Israel has never accepted any frontiers other than those of the Zionist concept of Eretz Israel (Land of Israel). Herzl defined this as extending "from the Brook of Egypt to the Euphrates" 2 and more significantly asserted: "We will demand the land we need: the more immigrants the more land." 3 Ben-Gurion explained 'Israel's refusal to define its borders in 1948 by reference to the refusal of the original 13 American states to define the US border and its subsequent expansion to 50 states stretching from the Atlantic to the mid-Pacific. Israel's 1967 conquests still fall short of the minimum territorial goals demanded of the 1919 Peace Conference: these included Southern Lebanon, Southern Syria to the gates of Damascus, Transjordan, and part of Sinai. 5 In January 1967 Premier

Eshkol told **Le Monde**'s Eric Rouleau, "there remains to us no more than 20 000 kilometers of ancient Palestine," thereby indicating, commented Rouleau, that he considers a part of Iraq, a part of Syria, West Jordan, and Transjordan to be part of "ancient Palestine." ⁶

-Israel and the Zionists have never recognized the rights of the indigenous Arab population, have never acknowledged the injustice done to them, and have proved incapable of even one humane gesture in their direction. "What Arabs? They are hardly of any consequence," replied the "moderate" Zionist leader, Chaim Weizmann, when Albert Einstein, who opposed the Jewish State, asked him: "What about the Arabs if Palestine were given to the Jews?" 8 This is the typical attitude of a racist settler movement.

In the British Imperial Scheme

The Balfour Declaration, November 2, 1917, expressed Britain's intention to assist "the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people." At that time, Jews made up 7% of the Palestine population. Most of them were opposed to political Zionism. The intentionally ambiguous 67-word Declaration, presented as the work of the British Government, had been drafted with elaborate care by the Zionists.9 It dismissed the indigenous Arab majority - 93% of the population owning 97.5% of the land as "existing non-Jewish communities." This was done, wrote J.M.N. Jeffries."to conceal the fact that the Arabs to all intents constituted the population of the country... to conceal the true ratio between Arabs and Jews and thereby to make easier the supersession of the former." 10 The Declaration guaranteed "religious" and undefined "civil" rights to these so-called "non-Jewish communities" but omitted any mention of political rights. In a memorandum to the British Government, August 11, 1919, Balfour was more frank: "In Palestine we do not propose even to go through the form of consulting the wishes of the present inhabitants of the country." 11

The "present inhabitants" had occupied Palestine as Arabs continuously for thirteen centuries, "a period of time conveying such evident and absolute ownership that anywhere else in the civilized world a kindred title would only be guestioned by lunatics and disregarded by rogues." 12 The Zionists claim Palestine on the basis of a promise received directly from God and an alleged Jewish historical connection which rests mainly on David and Solomon's 73-year rule — some 3000 years ago — over a part of Palestine. But if remote historical connection is to confer title deeds, these also belong to the Palestine Arabs. A great scholar, Sir James Frazer, asserted that:

in the opinion of competent judges the modern fellahin or Arabic-speaking peasants of Palestine are the descendants of pagan tribes which dwelt there before the Israelite invasion, and have clung to the soil ever since, being submerged but never destroyed by each successive wave of conquest which has swept over the land. 13

The Israelites came to Palestine as invaders; their occupation, never complete, was intermittent and unstable. For centuries before the Romans destroyed the temple in 70 AD — when Zionist mythology pretends all Jews were driven into world exile — the Jews had been emigrating from Palestine of their

own choice: influential Jewish settlements flourished in all the great cities of the Roman Empire and Persia, and Jews in Palestine at the beginning of the Christian era numbered but a small fraction of the total Jewish population of the Roman Empire alone. 14 For more than 2000 years the overwhelming majority of world Jewry lived outside Palestine because it wanted to — and still does. The "longing for Zion" of a part of the Jews was always reigious, differing little in character from the attachment of Christians to the Holy Land. 15 The 1881 pogroms in Russia provoked tens of thousands to emigrate annually to the US; a bare few hundred to Palestine. 16 Moreover, Zionist racial theory claiming purity of descent of modern European-American Jews from the ancient Hebrews is demonstrably false. 17

Initially predisposed to Zionism, the King-Crane Commission in 1919 asserted that the Zionist claim to Palestine could not be taken seriously. 18 But this claim provided a convenient pretext for a British presence in Palestine, as Weizmann frequently underscored. The most stalwart imperialists — Leopold Amery, Philip Kerr (later Lord Lothian), General Smuts of South Africa, etc. — were the most ardent Zionist enthusiasts. Amery, wrote Weizmann, "realized the importance of a Jewish Palestine in the British imperial scheme of things more than anyone else." 19 With the Balfour Declaration Britain created a problem where there was none, assumed responsibility for it, and so secured British claims in the Ottoman Empire and kept France away from the "strategic corridor" protecting Suez.

Under the cover of the League of Nations, Britain assigned itself the Palestine Mandate, all of whose im-

portant terms were written by the Zionists. 20 The Mandate sealed the British-Zionist alliance and in effect established a British World Zionist Organization condominium to rule Palestine. Under the Mandate Britain assisted the Zionists to build a state within a state since it was understood between them that the "National Home" was the Jewish State in incubation; 21 granted Jews everywhere a passport to enter Palestine "of right not on sufferance," thus destroying the political status of the indigenous population; allowed the Zionists to build their own military forces, their own racially exclusive school, labor, and cooperative system, and gave them an exclusive concession to exploit all Palestine. 22 In the period 1919-48, £ 300-£ 350 million (the pound sterling was then worth three to four times its present value) was contributed from abroad to Zionist state-building. This capital transfer amounted to £ 638 per immigrant — 16 times the per capita income of the Arab population. 23

To the indigenous Arab majority, whose opposition to this European settler invasion was held down by British police and military forces, the British-Zionist condominium denied all political rights and the means of self-defense. Yet Arab uprisings in 1921, 1929, 1933, and 1936-39 testified to an unremitting Arab struggle for the right to self-determination in their own country.

Within world Jewry the Zionists remained a minority. Without the rise of Nazism in Europe the Zionist Palestine venture would almost certainly have failed. The interaction of Zionism and Nazism played a crucial role in the establishment of the Jewish State.

Zionism and Nazism

Arnold Toynbee has pointed out: "Zionism and anti-Semitism are expressions of an identical point of view." 24 This is the alleged "indigestibility" of the Jews. "Each country can absorb only a limited number of Jews if she does not want disorders in her stomach. Germany already has too many Jews." This statement was made not by Julius Streicher but by Zionist leader Chaim Weizmann to a German audience in 1912. 25 Nazi anti-Semitic and Zionist propaganda, writes Rabbi Jacob Agus, 26 popularized the same slogans: that emancipation was a mistake; the presence of Jews in Europe, disruptive; that all Jews constitute "one folk" and are unique and unintegrable; that anti-Semitism is a natural, hence ineradicable, expression of the "folk feeling" of European nations and anti-semitic ravings therefore understandable. Benyamin Matovu 27 has documented the fact that direct reproduction of Zionist writings became the pattern of Nazi anti-Semitic propaganda. Among the Zionists most frequently quoted by the Nazis were Weizmann, Jacob Klatzkin, and Nahum Goldman, later a prime leader in the creation of Israel and longtime president of the World Zionist Organization, who held that "Germans have the right to prevent Jews from intruding in the affairs of their folk" and already in 1920 advanced the Jewish stab-in-the-back theory to explain the 1918 defeat. 28

Asking whether "the Zionist program and philosophy" contributed "decisively" to the Nazi extermination of six million Jews, Rabbi Agus concludes that on the basis of present knowledge "it is impossible to answer this ques-

tion." ²⁹ Nonetheless, he emphasizes that:

1) Zionist propaganda "could not but reinforce the basic anti-Semitic assumption of the Jews as an

eternal alien ... ";

2) the usefulness of anti-Semitism depended on its appeal to the large uncommitted middle class and this class "was neutralized and paralyzed in Central Europe by the feeling that Jews were alien and would-be emigrants by their own admission";

3) when Central Europe was opened to democratic ideas after the First World War the Zionist orientation of the Jews put liberal opponents of anti-Semitism on the

defensive;

4) in those countries where Jews were Zionist-oriented they were "marked for slaughter with hardly a ripple of protest, while in Western countries... where Jews were distinguished by religion only, concerted efforts were made to save them..."

There is more, however, to the Zionist-Nazi story than the identity of Nazi and Zionist propaganda about the Jews. In the tradition of Herzl, who held anti-semitic governments to be Zionism's best ally, German Zionists welcomed the Nazi rise to power as the death blow to assimilationism. 30 Zionist leaders offered the Nazi Government their cooperation in finding a solution to the Jewish question, urged Jews to wear the Yellow Star six years before the Nazis ordered it, and capitalized on their position as the only Jews able to associate with the Nazis to discredit non-Zionist Jews. 31 The Nazi Government and the Jewish Agency for Palestine concluded an agreement under which Zionist-selected Jews were permitted to emigrate to Palestine and transfer their

property to be exchanged there against British pounds: Palestine was flooded with German goods while American Jewry tried to organize a boycott of Nazi Germany. Zionist emissaries came from Palestine — in the words of the Zionist Kimche brothers - not "to save German Jews; that was not their job." 32 Their job was to select "suitable material," and they talked openly of "mutual interests." 33 They were even allowed to set up "training camps" for Palestine under Nazi auspices. 34 Zionists invited Eichmann to Palestine, and when the British refused him permission to enter, Histadrut representatives journeyed to Cairo to visit him. 35

The price for this Zionist-Nazi collaboration was, as Dr. Hannah Arendt has emphasized, inevitably paid by non-Zionist Jews, the nonselected majority who found "themselves confronted with two enemies - the Nazi authorities and the Jewish authorities." 36 The Nazi Government dropped its pro-Zionist policy in 1939, but organized Jewry's collaboration remained "the very cornerstone" of its Jewish policy. 37 Without it, writes Dr. Arendt, the "final solution" would not have been possible: "Without Jewish help in administrative and police works... there would have been chaos or an impossibly severe drain on German manpower." 38

The trial in Israel in which Zionist leader and high Israeli official Rudolf Kastner, backed by the full power of the Israeli Government, tried (unsuccessfully) to clear himself of charges of having assisted Eichmann in the slaughter of nearly a million Hungarian and Polish Jews; Ben Hecht's Perfidy, based on sworn evidence at this trial; Arendt's Eichmann in Jerusalem; Raul Hilberg's The Destruc-

tion of the European Jews — these clearly documented how Jewish Agency leaders withheld from the masses of Jews in Eastern Europe the fact that they were marked for shipment to death camps... [and] clearly suggest that by maintaining the Nazis' secret, the Zionist leadership, inside and outside Hitler's Europe, made unlikely a mass uprising of the Jews and enabled the route to the gas chamber to remain unblocked by the desperate rebellion of doomed men. In return, some hundreds of Zionist leaders were permitted to escape to Palestine. 39

Zionist leaders themselves insisted that their first concern was not rescue of the Jews but the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine. In 1943, at the height of the exterminations, Itzhak Greenbaum, head of the Jewish Agency Rescue Committee, declared: "If I am asked could you give from UJA [United Jewish Appeal] moneys to rescue Jews? I say 'No; and I say again, No.' In my opinion we have to resist that wave which puts Zionist activities in the second line." ⁴⁰

American Zionist leader Rabbi Abba Silver stated in 1946 "that the rescue of a certain number of refugees, however vital and urgent, is not Zionism and that the clear purpose of Zionism was and is to give the Jewish people the status of a nation." 41 Richard Crossman, a member of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry on Palestine, wrote: "Another important point has gradually emerged from the Zionists' own statements. Their main preoccupation is not to save the Jews alive out of Europe, but to get Jews into Palestine and establish a Jewish State." 42

In line with this policy the Zionists deliberately sabotaged all rescue efforts not directed to Palestine — among others, Roosevelt's plan to rescue 500 000; projects for settlement in Alaska, Australia, Surinam; a British parliamentary resolution for temporary refuge during the war. 43 "Who can tell how many thousands of Jewish lives might have been saved if these anti-Jewish pressures exerted by Jews had not been effected?" asked the Freeland League. " Erskine Childers, writing of this successful Zionist campaign to close the doors of other countries to Jewish refugees, found it "incredible that so grave and grim a campaign has received so little attention in the account of the Palestine struggle — it was a campaign that literally shaped all history." 45

Behind this grim campaign was Zionist determination to persuade the world and especially the US - to which Zionism had moved its power base during the war that there was only one solution to the refugee problem: the creation of a Jewish State. "For while many Americans might not support a Jewish State," wrote Richard Stevens, "traditional American humanitarianism could be exploited in favor of the Zionist cause through the refugee problem. Indeed... the refugee problem had to remain unsolved in order to insure the creation of a Jewish State in Palestine." 46 This Zionist campaign linking the refugee problem to the creation of the state was enormously successful in the US.

The Nazi chapter in Zionist statebuilding suggests answers to crucial

questions concerning the effect upon the Jews themselves of Zionist racial and collaborationist policies and of overriding Zionist power ambitions in Palestine. That Zionism contributed to the almost universal collaboration of organized Jewry with the Nazis and to the general absence of resistance can hardly be denied. The late William Zukerman pointed out:

The heroic men and women who died on the barricades of Warsaw belonged to a section of the Jews who held their home was in the countries where they had been born, had worked, and had contributed to wealth and culture... to them the future of European Jews, after the war, lay in Europe, in the homes they had loved and fought for... 47

Zionist Milltary Conquest

These Zionist policies show that the widely held concept of Israel as a refuge for the persecuted is mistaken and tell us much about the character of the Zionist settler movement in Palestine. Zionist callousness to the Jewish masses was matched by Zionist callousness to the indigenous Palestine population; Zionist "self-segregation" in the "land of exile" where assimilation is the main enemy, by Zionist "self-segregation" in the "land of destination" (Palestine) where the indigenous Arab population has always been the main enemy. Hence the practice of racial exclusiveness and indoctrination of schoolchildren both with hatred of the Arab 48 and with contempt for people of Jewish faith living in the Diaspora. 49

The Zionist state goal required, as the King-Crane Commission pointed out already in 1919, "practically complete dispossession" ⁵⁰ of the indigenous inhabitants. The

1942 Biltmore program demanded an exclusively Jewish State in all Palestine, unlimited immigration, and a Jewish Army. The 1943 "enlarged program" of the Zionist Organization in Palestine called for a Jewish State embracing all Palestine "and probably Transjordan," removal of the Arab population to Iraq, and "Jewish leadership for the whole Middle East in the fields of economic development and control." 51 In 1944 the British Labour Party National Executive backing a Jewish Palestine State advocated forcible removal of the Arab population and extension of Palestine's borders at the expense of neighboring Arab states. 52

Plans to implement this program got under way during the war if not before: "Boastful revelations made after the birth of the State of Israel proclaimed that practically everything that happened between 1945 and 1948 was part of an impressive overall plan..." 53

The US Minister in Cairo in 1944 reported Zionist arms purchases over a two-year period from the Vichy French and Zionist determination to establish the Jewish State "despite any opposition from the one million Arabs living there." In 1945 David Ben-Gurion, visiting New York, succeeded in mobilizing millions of dollars from 18 Jewish millionaires to buy arms industries at cut-rate prices from the United States. 55

A terrorist campaign directed first to evicting the British and then the indigenous Arab population began in 1944. A longtime Zionist, I. F. Stone, acknowledged that: "In the case of Palestine, as of other such struggles, the Mother Country was assailed because it showed more concern for the native majority than was palatable to the colonialist minority." ³⁶ Illegal immigration,

seizure of arms and explosives, demolitions carried out by the Haganah, the Stern and Irgun gangs aimed at the Arabs as well as the British. The Haganah's destruction of all Palestine's rail and road communications with its Arab neighbors in June 1946 was, for example, timed to coincide with the Arab League conference on Palestine at Bludan.

Because the Zionist campaign was a settler revolt with powerful backing from its American-European home base, British reaction was highly restrained. 57 Eventually the Zionist terrorist campaign inside Palestine and Zionist pressures outside coupled with US support for Zionist demands induced Britain to hand the "Palestine problem" to the American-dominated UN. In 1946 the Jewish Agency had proposed a partition plan to the US and British Governments, 58 and the Majority UNSCOP Report now also advocated partition. Scandalous Zionist and US pressures on UN delegations (ranging from mink coats for delegates' wives to promises of economic aid and threats of economic reprisals 59) succeeded in compelling the General Assembly — where the necessary votes had been lacking three days earlier — to adopt the Partition Resolution, November 29, 1947, by the narrow margin of three votes. Only three Afro-Asian states voted for it: South Africa, and in a last minute switch achieved by US arm-twisting, Liberia and the Philippines. To the Arabs and other Afro-Asians the partition vote was only a new form of European-American diktat.

The resolution provided for internationalizing Jerusalem and creating an independent Jewish State (498 000 Jews and 497 000 Arabs)

and an independent Arab State (725 000 Arabs and 10 000 Jews). It awarded the Jews, barely a third of the population and owning less than 6% of the land, 56% of the total area of Palestine including its most fertile parts.

The Arabs rejected partition on the grounds that 1) partition of a country against the will of the majority of its inhabitants violated the UN Charter, the right to self-determination, international law and practice; and that 2) the Jews exclusively were to rule a state that was 50% Arab and in which Arabs owned more than 90% of the land. Arab and Asian demands for a plebiscite in Palestine and for a World Court decision on the competency of the UN to decree partition were brushed aside.

The Zionists embraced partition "with all the fervor of a commandment born on the crest of Mt. Sinai" 60 not because they were satisfied with this allocation but because it offered a bridgehead for the seizure of all Palestine and eviction of the Arabs. Already in 1946 the Haganah had told the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry: "If you accept the Zionist solution but are unable or unwilling to enforce it, please do not interfere, and we ourselves will secure its implementation." 61 In the month before the UN partition vote, the Zionists. by their own admission, 62 decided to hold on to all 33 Jewish settlements outside the boundaries of the proposed Jewish State as well as other isolated settlements. Former Haganah Commander Netanel Lorch. pointing out the "far-reaching implicat ons of this decision," said:

It was realized that the defense of Tel Aviv must start at Revivim in the Negev; of Jerusalem at Etzion in the Hebron mountains [Arab State area]; and of Haifa at Yechiam in Western Galilee [Arab State area]. Those settlements were defensive barriers and potential offensive bases of the State which was about to be established. 63

This decision and the reference to the "defense of Jerusalem" show that the Zionists intended to respect neither the partition boundaries nor the internationalization of Jerusalem and already pointed to the military offensive they were to launch six weeks before Arab armies entered the Arab State area (never the Jewish State area) to prevent Zionist seizure of all Palestine and eviction of its Moslem and Christian population. Of this so-called "Arab invasion" which Israel claims "set aside the 1947 Partition boundaries by force," 64 UN Commander Burns said: "It would seem that the Arabs outside Palestine should have as much right to come to the assistance of Arabs in Palestine as Jews outside Palestine to come to the assistance of Jews within." 65

Israel asserts that the "Arab aggression" rendered "all UN resolutions null and void" including, as Burns wryly remarked, 66 those adopted long after the alleged aggression. Israel has used the pretext of "Arab aggression" to free itself of all legal restraints to expand as it likes ever since and to refuse repatriation of the evicted Palestinians.

The half-year period between the partition vote and May 15, 1948, in Prof. Hocking's words, "contains the key to all that followed." ⁶⁷ The partition decision, wrote Prof. Walid Khalidi, "was a revolutionary decision, designed to effect a radical territorial redistribution in favour of the Zionists. To succeed the Zionists had to revolutionize the status quo

and action, initiative, and offense were therefore the sine qua non for the realization of Zionist objectives." 68

Vis-a-vis the Palestine Arabs. Zionist military power was overwhelming. In Palestine, wrote Clare Hollingworth, "ill-organized unruly groups of Arabs were faced by a powerful. efficient. and utterly ruthless machine: there was never any doubt of the result." 69 Lorch concedes that the Palestine Arabs "had no full time military force, no consolidated organic units, no unicommand" and "no naval strength"; and that their "most powerful" 70 military institution was the age-old system by which a sheik or village chieftain could call up his followers for a specific purpose for a few days. But, said Hollingworth, "not one Arab in a thousand had any experience of modern warfare or warfare at all." 71 Palestinians were armed, if at all, with rifles left over from the 1936 rebellion. In January 1948 volunteers from other Arab States began crossing into Palestine. This so-called "Arab Liberation Army" was "non-descript" "badly and incongruously armed with out-of-date rifles and pistols dating back to the First World War if not earlier." 72 (Some had been captured by the Wahabis from the Turks in the 19th century. 73) These volunteers who eventually numbered perhaps 4000 made only two major attacks before May 15, both unsuccessful. Lorch described "Arab actions" by the end of February as "still sporadic, directed from various centers, and often the result of 'private enterprise'." 74 In short, the efforts of a people without military training or experience and without unified leadership to hold on to their country and home in face of a ruthless Zionist machine powered by aliens and arms coming from all

over the world. On the morrow of the partition vote, Britain handed Tel Aviv and its environs to the local Jewish authorities who thereafter used its port to import arms


and fighting men.

The Zionist machine 75 included three Palmach brigades, six Khish (field force) brigades, two Irgun brigades plus the Khim (garrison) troops, the Jewish Settlement Police. the Gadna Youth battalions, and the armed settlers. Its arms were plentiful. Ha Sepher Ha Palmach (Book of the Palmach) 76 reveals that local Zionist arms factories were in March producing 100 sub-machine guns a day (soon increased to 200); 400 000 rounds of 9 mm ammunition per month; flame throwers; antitank guns; a heavy mortar whose 60 lb. TNT shells were used especially against civilian quarters; as well as large numbers of grenades and 2and 3-inch mortar shells. The first Czech arms shipment arrived the end of March; the second, a few days later.

The Palestine Arabs' only strength was that they were in place. To achieve its aims the Zionist machine had to dislodge them. On the morrow of the partition vote, Professor


Hocking pointed out:

Disorders broke out from both sides. In the confusion a pattern began to emerge, an organized military campaign systematically directed towards two major objectives: first to confirm Jewish domination over the Arabs within the proposed limits of the Jewish State and second, to enlarge these limits. The Irgun, the Stern Gang, and the Haganah... began openly to attack Arab villages and cities, driving out the inhabitants or massacring those who stood by their homes and fields... That




Palestine


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
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


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


Area occupied 1956





Area occupied 1967



Zionist Plan, 1919

this was a planned military maneuvre there is no longer the

slightest doubt. 33

Israeli sources — Ha Sepher Ha Palmach, Volumes I and II, and Qurvot 1948 (Battles 1948) — describe this military campaign - Plan C and Plan D — in detail. Zionist strategy was based on the timetable of British withdrawal. The British decision to maintain de jure authority over Palestine, but to evacuate their forces from successive areas by stages, permitted the Zionists to evict the Arab population and seize strategic points within the Arab State area behind the shield of Britain's authority, which prevented any interference from regular Arab armies. The Zionist offensive was facilitated by the fact that the British handed over more and more Jewish areas but lingered in Arab areas where they impeded any Arab defense preparations and did nothing to stop Zionist attacks on the Arabs.

Plan C, the first phase of the Zionist strategy, involved: 1) putting constant pressure everywhere against the Palestine Arabs (raids on villages and terrorist attacks on Arab quarters in the cities), and 2) maintaining contact with the Jewish settlements outside the Jewish State area. 79 Palmach Commander Yigal Allon explained that this contact was necessary for the coming offensive to unite with these sattlements. 80 Plan D, the second phase, was an all-out offensive to conquer and hold territory in the wake of the withdrawing British forces. Qurvot 1948 defined Plan D's purpose as "control of the area given to us by the UN in addition to areas occupied by us which were outside these borders [our emphasis] and the setting up of forces to counter the possible invasion of

Arab armies after May 15." 81

Plan D went into effect at the end of March. Its timing was dictated by completion of Zionist mobilization. Plan C's failure so far to force any significant flight of Arabs, reversal of the US position on partition, and the beginning of a Security Council retreat from it. 82 Of 13 major military operations included in Plan D, eight were carried out outside the Jewish State area and all before May 15 when Arab armies entered the Arab State area to try to prevent the Zionist seizure of all Palestine and halt the eviction of its Arab inhabitants. 83 Yigal Allon wrote of this pre-May 15, 1948, period of the war:

This stage of the war, which was made possible by the gradual British evacuation... gave Haganah valuable victories. Thanks to the local offensive war, the continuity of Jewish territories was accomplished and also the penetration of our forces into Arab areas... If it wasn't for the Arab invasion, there would have been no stop to the expansion of the forces of the Haganah, who could have, with the same drive, reached the natural borders of Western Israel... [our emphasis].

On May 15, 1948, the Zionists were indeed on their way to complete military dominance of Palestine and 300 000 had expelled Palestine Arabs. Zionist propaganda maintains that the Arabs left on orders of their leaders — although in 1948 it said nothing whatever about these alleged orders 85 and has never produced a single piece of primary evidence. Erskine Childers' study of the records of the BBC 86 — which monitored all Middle East broadcasts throughout 1948 - and Professor Khalidi's study of the Arab press and Arab radio broadcasts during this period, 87 have completely refuted this Zionist claim. Childers found not even one appeal or order from any Arab leader calling on the people to leave, but many appeals, even flat orders, to the civilians of Palestine to stay put. Zionist sources themselves, moreover, describe the terrorist and psychological warfare used to evict the Palestinians. 88 Of the effect of the massacre of Deir Yassin, April 9 called by Toynbee "comparable to the crimes committed by the Nazis against the Jews" — Menachem Begin boasted: "Of the about 800 000 Arabs who lived in the present territory of Israel, only some 165 000 are still there. The political and economic significance of this development can hardly be overestimated." 89

Palmach Commander Allon described the tactics he used before May 15 "to clean the inner Galilee":

I gathered all the Jewish mukhtars, who have contact with Arabs in different villages, and asked them to whisper in the ears of some Arabs that a great Jewish reinforcement had arrived in Galilee and that it is going to burn all of the villages of Huleh. They should suggest to the Arabs, as their friends, to escape while there was still time... The tactic reached its goal completely... The wide areas were cleaned...90

It was this mass exodus of the Palestine Arabs in face of the Zionist military offensive that compelled reluctant Arab Governments to send their armies into the Arab State area of Palestine. This decision was not taken until early May and in the case of the Egyptian Army not until May 12. 91

So much for the Israeli pretension that Arab armies "set aside the 1947 Partition boundaries by force." When these armies entered the Arab State area, they found Zionist miltary forces occupying strategic areas well inside it.

The "State of Israel" (so designated to signify that it was not yet coterminous with Eretz Israel) was proclaimed May 14 in defiance of UN resolutions of April 17 and May 14 be and of the Partition Resolution itself, which stipulated that the two states were to come into being only two months after the end of the Mandate. This was done in accordance with a secret deal between Weizmann and President Truman, of which the US UN delegation, then arguing for a UN trusteeship over Palestine, was unaware. 93

The outcome of the war between Israeli forces driving to seize all Palestine and Arab armies which tried to prevent this was determined by the support Israel received from its European-American home base. In violation of UN truce orders prohibiting import of arms, Israel imported tons of proscribed weapons from West and East. In violation of UN directives stipulating no alteration of battle lines and no gains for either side during the truce, Israel gained immensely from military offensives in the Negev, to the Agaba Gulf and through Central Galilee, while the British cut off ammunition supplies to Arab armies. 94

The Palestine Arabs

By the end of 1948, Israel had evicted nearly a million Palestine Arabs — shorn of their homes, lands, and most personal property. Even if one chooses to believe in face of the evidence that the Arabs fled "voluntarily" before — to use the words of the Zionist Jan Kimche — "the orgy of looting and wanton destruction which hangs like a black pall over almost all the Jewish military successes," 95 what of it?

Since when, asks Professor Erich Fromm, is flight "punishable by confiscation of property and by being barred from returning to the land on which a people's forefathers have lived for generations?" 96 International law and equity guarantee the rights of individuals in such circumstances whatever their nationality or creed. Moreover, because there were to have been as many Arabs as Jews in the Jewish State, the Partition Resolution had specifically guaranteed the civil, political, economic, religious, and property rights of the Arabs.

Of the first 370 Jewish settlements established after 1948, 350 were on the property of evicted Arabs. Israel took over 388 Arab towns and villages containing nearly half the buildings in Palestine, 10 000 shops, businesses, and stores, and some 30 000 acres of citrus groves (from which it drew ¼ of its foreign exchange earnings). 97 Arab losses in property and revenue had by 1962 reached over \$2000 million.98 This, in Toynbee's words, is robbery and "all Israel is implicated in the matter of the massacre and expulsion of the Palestine Arabs because they have taken the land and the property which is legally and rightfully still that of the Arabs." 99 Most of the Arabs to whom all this belongs have lived for 20 years in refugee camps on a dole of 1500 calories a day and without a penny of compensation.

Israel's policy of placing all responsibility for the refugees on the Arab states is designed to hide its own crimes against these people and to confuse the real issue: that the Palestine dispute is, first of all, a dispute between Israel and the Palestine Arabs, citizens of a nation that has been obliterated from the

map but which lives in them and which they are determined to restore; it is only secondarily a dispute between the Arab states and Israel.

The Arab States and Israel

The Arab State conflict with Israel has to do primarily with Israel's expansionist character. "To maintain the status quo will not do," said Ben-Gurion. "We have set up a dynamic state bent upon expansion." 100 This proved no idle boast. The Partition Resolution allotted the "Jewish State" 5500 square miles of Palestine. By the end of 1949, Israel occupied 7100 square By 1952, 7800. By 1955, 7993. 101 Today it occupies more than 30 000 square miles and has proclaimed its intention to retain much if not all of this area. Israel's bent for expansion has been throughout its existence the sum and substance of its policy towards the Arab states.

israel's first application for UN membership was rejected in December 1948 because it occupied land outside the Partition boundaries and had expelled the Arab inhabitants. Israel tricked the UN into approving its second application by pretending to accept the provisions of the Partition Resolution: on May 12, 1949, it joined the Arab states in signing the Lausanne Protocol in which both sides agreed to negotiate a settlement within the framework of the Partition Resolution. 102 Ben-Gurion later explained 103 that this was done only to influence the UN to approve Israel's admission. Once it was admitted to the UN, almost coincident with its signature of the Protocol, Israel promptly repudiated its obligations under the Protocol. 104 The UN, however, made Israel's admission conditional on its compliance with the Partition Resolution (on territory and internationalization of Jerusalem) and the December 11, 1948, Resolution de-

ding that it repatriate the refugees. Since Israel has never complied with these resolutions, its membership in the UN is illegal.

The Armistice Agreements

"Every step in the establishment of the Zionist State has been a challenge to justice," wrote UN Commander Elmo Hutchison. "It was an attempt partially to right this wrong that led to the Armistice Agreements of 1949. The intention then was to implement the UN

Partition Plan." 105

The Security Council clearly defined the Armistice Agreements as "provisional," "dictated exclusively by military not political considerations," and the Armistice demarcation lines as "not to be construed in any sense as a political or territorial boundary." Israel, however, in an effort to compel the Arab states to recognize the fait accompli of its military conquests, claimed the Agreements ended the state of war and until the June 1967 war claimed the Armistice lines as its political boundaries. The Arabs maintained that the Agreements provided only a suspension of hostilities. This position is supported by international law, the plain language of the UN resolutions and of the Agreements themselves.

For 20 years Israel's propaganda has pictured its existence as constantly threatened by the Arab states. UN records and the fact of Israel's territorial aggrandizement show that it is the existence and territorial integrity of the Arab states that have been constantly threatened and encroached upon by Israel. Taken together, Israel's violations of the Armistice Agreements reveal a calculated policy of provocation and aggression. General

Dayan called it a policy of "calculated violations which we had to weigh carefully against political risks." 1016

In the period mid-1949 to April 1967. Israel was condemned by the UN 107 for more than 30 military attacks by its regular armed forces into Arab territory, attacks often involving massacre of civilians and destruction of homes and villages. No Arab State has ever made an attack by its regular armed forces into Israeli-held territory. Arab violations of the Armistice have consisted in the main of individual crossings by farmers and villagers who return to their homes to retrieve crops and belongings. Responsibility for such violations lies with Israel since it bars the refugees' return and with those who drew the demarcation lines in such a way as to cut off villages from their water sources or fertile lands. 108 Israel used these infiltrations and incidents inside Israel which could not be attributed to the Arabs 109 as a pretext for "retaliatory raids" by its Army. These raids, General Dayan told Army officers in August 1955, 110 aimed to compel the Arabs to accept "peace" on Israel's terms. Israel's aggressions also served to assure financial support from abroad and to acquire springboards for future and larger aggressions. 111

Israel has always talked peace to hide its aggressive policy from world public opinion and is never more eloquent on this subject than just before or just after some military attack or massacre. If Arab leaders have talked war, they did so only to hide their impotence before the international power alignment protecting Israel and its ag-

gressions.

The June 1967 War

The hidden dynamic of Israel's June 1967 aggression is revealed in Premier Eshkol's Foreword to the 1966 Israeli Government Yearbook, where he declares that it will not be enough to bring "two or three or even four million Jews to Israel" since Zionist goals and "the needs of the State are involved."

Israel's propaganda build-up for its new aggression began in January 1964 coincident with the Arab Summit decision to divert the Arab headwaters of the Jordan River for Arab use. Of the Jordan's flow, 77% originates in Arab states which therefore have a right to these waters. The planned Arab diversion would have appropriated roughly 40% of these waters — less than the 60% share allotted to the Arab states in the Johnston proposals 1953/5. 112 Yet Israel campaigned against the plan as "a direct menace to its existence," 113 and threatened military action to prevent its execution. The plan posed a threat only to Israel's Jordan-Negev diversion, which is based on appropriation of most if not all of the sweet waters of the Jordan for use outside the river basin and which is necessary to fulfill Israei's ambitions for unlimited immigration and economicmilitary expansion. The Johnson Administration encouraged Israel's aggressive reaction, and a new Western arms build-up of Israel now began. In April 1965, the US Ambassador in Tel Aviv apologized to Foreign Minister Meier "for recent declarations of high State Department officials that US arms deliveries to Israel were linked to promises not to react with force to the Arab diversion." 114 Israel's threats, 115 bombardments of the

diversion works, and US refusal to condemn these attacks induced President Nasser to announce abandonment of the Arab project,

May 31, 1965.

This should have satisfied Israel and the US if their aim was solely to protect the Jordan-Negev diversion. On the contrary Israel's aggressiveness increased. With US and British backing it began a campaign to open the Suez Canal to Israeli shipping as demanded in a 1951 Security Council Resolution. Egypt's position has consistently been that it would comply with this resolution if Israel would comply with the UN resolutions applying to it. These include the following which remain unimplemented to this day: Partition; Repatriation and Compensation of the Refugees (December 11, 1948); Conditions on Israel's Admission to the UN (May 11, 1949); Internationalization of Jerusalem (December 9, 1949); Protection of the Rights, Properties, and Interests of the Refugees (December 14, 1950). As President Nasser stated in 1959: "The resolutions concerning Palestine are an indivisible entity...it would be unfair if only we are asked to implement the one resolution on our side while Israel does not implement those on her side." 116

Israel found another pretext for its war build-up in 1965 when Palestinian fedayin (commandos) began to make small raids into Israel. The fedayin, said the Journal de Geneve, are "a concrete and living expression of the Palestine people which has itself decided to fight and die in order to recover its usurped country." 117 Israel, in line with its policy of denying the existence of the Palestine people, chose to hold Syria responsible and escalated its attacks and threats against Syria throughout 1966 and

the first half of 1967.

In May 1967, when President Nasser asked UNEF's withdrawal. partially reimposed the Agaba blockade, and moved his troops into Sinai, he was acting within Egypt's sovereign rights, seeking to wipe out the last vestiges of Israel's 1956 aggression, and above all to counter repeated Israeli threats to overthrow the Damascus government. His offer to reactivate the Egypt-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission, his proposal for a global review of the Palestine question at the UN, his acceptance of U Thant's proposals, and his answers to President Johnson's messages made perfectly clear the defensive character of these actions and his desire for a

political solution.118

Israel refused, as it always has, to submit its case to international law or the UN since its existence is based on the right of conquest: "Not one inch of land! Not one refugee!" Hence there is nothing to "negotiate" except total Arab surrender. Israel's 1967 aggression was another step to attain this end. Closure of the Agaba Gulf provided only a long-sought pretext. Israel's presence on the Gulf is illegal and in violation of the Egyptian-Israeli Armistice Agreement, which specifically excludes Israel from the Gulf. 119 Israel seized its position on the Gulf by armed force 13 days after signing the Armistice in one of its many "calculated violations" to occupy additional Arab land, Enforcement of the Armistice Agreement would compel Israel's withdrawal from the Gulf. The question of whether or not the Tiran Strait is an international waterway should be referred to the World Court. Closure of the Strait, through which passed no more than 5% of Israel's external commerce, posed a threat not to its existence but, as the

Jewish Observer & Middle East Review (June 2, 1967) revealed, to its plan to build an oil pipeline from the Aqaba Gulf to the Mediterranean to compete with the Suez Canal and break its monopoly. (This project is now under way.)

Statements of Israeli leaders since the war and Israel's systematic policy of attempting to empty the occupied territories of Arabs show clearly that its demand for "direct peace negotiations" is simply a smokescreen behind which it will hang on to most if not all these territories. The US fully supports Israel's diktat. A State Department official commented after the June war:

Israel has probably done more for the US in the Middle East in relation to money and effort invested than any of our so-called allies and friends elsewhere round the globe since the end of the Second World War. In the Far East we can get almost no one to help us in Viet-Nam. Here the Israelis won, the war singlehandedly, have taken us off the hook, and have served our interest as well

as theirs. 120

The Arab peoples, above all the Palestinian people, will not and cannot accept the existence of Israel. a colonial-type creature imposed by forces outside the area. This does not mean - and the Zionists know this - that they plan the genocide of its Jewish inhabitants. Theirs is a political goal no different in character from the goal of the liberation movement in South Africa. In this goal, they should have the support of all democratic and progressive peoples, including the Jewish masses, who have also been victims of Zionism, and are being led by Zionism towards another disaster.

Notes

- Among numerous examples see David Ben-Gurion: "Establishment of the State was not in effect given in the UN resolution of last November 29... but our ability to bring about a decision in the country by force." Daily News Bulletin, Jewish Telegraph Agency, April 26, 1963. For the main UN resolutions defied by Israel see below.
- ² The Complete Diaries of Theodor Herzl, Vol. II, Herzl Foundation, 1960, p. 711.
- 3 Ibid., pp. 701-702.
- 4 Haretz, October 20, 1967. The Arabs, in other words, are Israel's Red Indians.
- Document submitted by the Zionist Organization to the Peace Conference in Paris, February 3, 1919, in J.D. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East Documentary Record: 1914-1956, Vol. II, Princeton, N.J., 1956, pp. 45-48.
- 6 Le Monde, January 13, 1967; Eric Rouleau et al., Israel et les Arabes, Paris, 1967, pp. 68-69.
- Einstein testified before the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry on Palestine, The New York Times, January 12, 1946, p. 7, col. 1: "The State idea is not according to my heart. I cannot understand why it is needed. It is connected with narrow-mindedness and economic obstacles. I believe it is bad. I have always been against it." In his Out of My Later Years, New York, 1950, p. 263, he expressed his resistance to "the idea of a Jewish State" and his fear of the "damage Judaism will sustain." Alfred Lilienthal, What Price Israel?, Chicago, 1953, pp. 171-173, has exposed the story of the Zionist "capture" of Einstein.
- 8 Einstein interview, in Alfred Lilienthal, There Goes the Middle East, New York, 1957, p. 240.

- 9 See J.M.N. Jeffries, Palestine the Reality, London, 1939, Chapter XI.
- 10 Ibid.
- 11 First Series of Documents on British Foreign Policy, ed. by Woodward and Butler (HMSO 1952), Vol. IV, Chap. 2. p. 340.
- 12 Jeffries, op. cit., p. 33.
- 13 Sir James George Frazer, Folklore in the Old Testament, Studies in Comparative Religion, Legend and Law, abridged edition, New York, 1923, p. 167. See also Sir Richard Temple, Palestine Illustrated, London, 1888, p. 125.
- 14 See Encyclopedia Biblica, a Dictionary of the Bible, London MDCCCXCIX, Vol. I, Dispersion, Col. 1107-1112; also Jeffries, op. cit., p. 30, citing the Zionist Leonard Stein. On the Israelite connection with Palestine see also Jeffries, Chapters I and IV; Neville Barbour, Nisi Dominus, London, 1946, Chaps. I and II.
- 15 See Rabbi Jacob Agus, "Myth, Faith and Reality in Jewish Life," Studies of the Leo Baeck Institute, ed. Max Kreutzberger, New York, 1967, p. 226.
- 16 S.M. Dubnow, Die neueste Geschichte des judischen Volkes 1789-1914, Berlin, Judischer Verlag, 1920-23, Tome III, p. 327, cited in Maxime Rodinson, "Israël, fait colonial", Les Temps Modernes, June 1967.
- ¹⁷ See the distinguished anthropologist Juan Comas, in Issues (American Council for Judaism), Winter 1965-66, pp. 21-23; and Harry I. Shapiro, The Jewish People, UNESCO, 1960, pp. 74-75.
- 18 Harry N. Howard, The King-Crane Commission, Beirut, 1963, p. 351.
- 19 Chaim Weizmann, Trial and Error, New York, 1949, p. 182. See also pp. 366 and 179.

- 20 Jeffries, op. cit., pp. 521-543 for documentation.
- 21 See Weizmann, op. cit., pp. 211-212; Jeffries, op. cit., p. 39.
- 22 This was the Rutenberg Concession. See Jeffries, Chap. XXV.
- ²³ George C. Corm, Les finances d'Israël, Institute for Palestine Studies, Beirut, 1968, p. 23.
- 24 To the American Council for Judaism, Philadelphia, The New York Times, May 7, 1961.
- 25 March 18, 1912, Berlin. Cited by Benyamin Matovu, "The Zionist Wish and the Nazi Deed, How Zionist Propaganda Fed Nazi Theorists," Issues, Winter 1966-67.
- ²⁶ Agus, op. cit., and Agus, The Meaning of Jewish History, New York, 1963, Vol. II, pp. 387-445.
- 27 Matovu, op. cit.
- 28 Cited by Agus, Meaning, op. cit., pp. 427-428.
- 29 Ibid., p. 442 et seq.
- 30 Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem, London, 1963, p. 54.
- 31 Ibid., pp. 54-55.
- 32 Jan & David Kimche, The Secret Road: "Illegal" Migration of a People 1938-48, London, 1954, p. 27.
- 33 Arendt, op. cit., pp. 55-56.
- 34 Kimche, op. cit., p. 18.
- 35 Arendt, op. cit., p. 56.
- 36 Thid.
- 37 Ibid., pp. 104-111.
- 38 Ibid., p. 104.
- 39 Matovu, op. cit.
- 40 Statement to the Zionist Executive Council, February 18, 1943: "On the Holocaust and the Reaction." Cited in Ben Hecht, Perfidy, New York, 1961, p. 50.

- 41 Statement to the Administrative Council of the Zionist Organization of America, July 13, 1946.
- 42 Richard Crossman, Palestine Mission, Hamish Hamilton, London, p. 47.
- Is See Morris L. Ernst's account of the Zionist sabotage of Roosevelt's plan in "Jewish Self-Segregation is Reactionary," Council News (American Council for Judaism), May 1950; L.M. Fruchtbaum, "Where Else Could the Jews Have Gone?", Issues, Winter 1967/Spring 1968, an account of the Zionist sabotage of The Freeland League's projects for settlement of Jewish refugees; and letter to The Times (London), Reuters, June 6, 1961, from Dr. Solomon Schonfeld, executive director, Religious Emergency Council, set up by Britain's Chief Rabbi to help Nazi victims.
- 44 Freeland magazine, New York, October-November 1959.
- 45 Childers, Spectator, July 22, 1960.
- 46 Richard P. Stevens, American Zionism and US Foreign Policy, New York, 1962, p. 28.
- 47 The Jewish Newsletter, cited by Elmer Berger, The Jewish Dilemma, New York, 1946, p. 37.
- 48 See Moshe Menuhin, The Decadence of Judaism in Our Time, New York, 1965, p. 50. Menuhin, father of Yehudi Menuhin, was a member of the first graduating class of the Gymnazia Herzlia in Tel Aviv. He says that pupils were required to dedicate themselves to the task of redeeming "our Jewish homeland" by making it goyimrein (clear of Arabs).
- 49 Prof. Yehezkel Kaufman wrote of the textbooks used in Hebrew schools in Mandated Palestine: "All this sounds as if it had come straight out of a textbook of German 'racial science'." Moznayim, IV, 1933, a periodical published in Palestine, cited by Michael Selzer, "The Jewishness of Zionism: A Continuing Controversy," Issues, Autumn 1967.
- 50 Harry N. Howard, op. cit., "Appendix: The Recommendations of the King-Crane Commission," p. 350.
- 51 Conveyed to General Patrick Hurley, President Roosevelt's personal repre-

- sentative. Foreign Relations of the US: Near East and Africa, Washington, DC, 1966, Vol. IV, pp. 776-777.
- 52 John Marlowe, The Seat of Pilate, London, 1959, p. 199.
- 53 Clare Hollingworth, The Arabs and the West, London, 1952, p. 136.
- 54 Foreign Relations, op. cit., p. 748.
- 55 Michel Bar-Zohar, Le prophète armé, Paris, 1966, pp. 114-115.
- 56 I.F. Stone, "Return or Invasion? A Humanist Reappraisal," N.Y. Review of Books, August 3, 1967.
- 57 See Marlowe, op. cit., pp. 228-232.
- 58 Ibid., p. 214.
- 59 See Richard P. Stevens, American Zionism and US Foreign Policy, New York, 1962, Chapter 7; also statement of Congressman Lawrence H. Smith, US Congressional Record, December 18, 1947, p. 1176, for an account of how the partition vote was twice postponed because the necessary votes were lacking and how American pressures secured the three decisive votes for partition from Haiti, Liberia, and the Philippines, all of which had previously opposed it.
- 60 Kenneth W. Bilby, New Star in the Near East, New York, 1950, p. 261.
- 61 Cited in Walid Khalidi, "Plan Dalet, The Zionist Master Plan for the Conquest of Palestine," Middle East Forum, November 1961.
- 62 Netanel Lorch, Edge of the Sword, New York, 1961, p. 58.
- 63 Ibid., p. 58.
- 64 For example, Abba Eban, "Reality and Vision in the Middle East," Foreign Affairs, July 1965, Vol. 43, No. 4.
- 65 E.M.L. Burns, Between Arab and Israeli, London, 1962, p. 127.
- 66 Ibid., p. 127.
- 67 Dr. William Ernest Hocking, Peace by Persuasion in the Middle East, Washington, DC, 1957, p. 3.

- 68 Khalidi, op. cit.
- 69 Hollingworth, op. cit., p. 141.
- 70 Lorch, op. cit., pp. 37-38.
- 71 Hollingworth, op. cit., p. 160.
- 72 Ibid., p. 156.
- 73 See Lorch, op. cit., p. 82, citing an Iraqi officer.
- 74 Ibid., p. 67.
- 75 As of March 1948 according to Khalidi, op. cit., based on Zionist sources including Lorch, Kimche, Clash of Destinies and Ha Sepher Ha Palmach, Volumes I and II, and Qurvot 1948.
- 76 Volume II, page 51, cited in Khalidi.
- 77 Khalidi, op. cit.
- 78 Hocking, op. cit.
- 79 Cited in Khalidi, op. cit., from the Hebrew sources.
- 50 Ibid. A second reason was to avert any enemy advance against civilian centers.
- 81 Qurvot 1948, p. 16, cited in Khalidi.
- 82 The US turned its back on partition in mid-March when it proposed to the Security Council a temporary trusteeship over Palestine.
- 83 Khalidi, op. cit.
- 84 Ha Sepher, Vol. II, cited in Khalidi.
- 85 The Zionist myth of the Arab orders to leave was concocted only in 1949 when Zionists realized the effect on public opinion of their treatment of the Palestine Arabs. See Walid Khalidi, "Why Did the Palestinians Leave?", Middle East Forum, July 1959.
- Se Erskine Childers, "The Other Exodus," Spectator, May 12, 1961 and June 16, 1961.
- 87 Khalidi, "Why Did the Palestinians Leave?", op. cit., and "The Fall of Haifa," Middle East Forum, December 1959.
- ss For example, Arthur Koestler, Promise and Fulfillment; Meyer Levin, Jerusalem Embattled; Harry Sacher, Establishment of the State of Israel; Jan Kimche, Seven Fallen Pillars.

- 89 Menachem Begin, The Revolt, Story of the Irgun, Tel Aviv, 1964, p. 164.
- 90 Ha Sepher, Vol. 2, p. 286, cited in Khalidi.
- 91 The Zionists themselves admitted that until they launched their all-out military offensive, Arab governments were still hoping and thinking in terms of diplomatic solutions. See Haganah Radio report of March 31, 1948, cited in Khalidi, "Why Did the Arabs Leave?"
- 92 The first calling for "further consideration of the future Government of Palestine," the second in effect suspending the attempt to implement partition by relieving the Palestine Commission of its task.
- 93 See Christopher Sykes, Crossroads to Israel, London, 1965, pp. 429-433.
- 94 See Bilby, op. cit., p. 261.
- 95 Jan Kimche, Seven Fallen Pillars, New York, 1953, p. 234.
- 96 Jewish Newsletter, New York, February 9, 1959.
- 97 Don Peretz, The Middle East Today, New York, 1963, p. 297.
- 98 Corm, op. cit., p. 26.
- ⁹⁹ Toynbee, at McGill University, Montreal, January 31, 1961.
- 100 David Ben-Gurion, Destiny and Rebirth of Israel, London, 1959, p. 419.
- 101 World Almanac 1950, p. 193; 1952, p. 329; 1955, p. 359, where the figure is given as 8048 square miles but corrected in the 1963 edition to 7993.
- 102 The Protocol appears as Annex B to the Palestine Commission Report (Doc. A. 127) of June 21, 1949. It was signed for Israel by Walter Eytan.
- 103 Government of Israel Yearbook 1950, pp. 95-96.
- 104 Today Israel denies it ever signed. See article from Nablus in Le Monde, July 20, 1967.
- 105 Commander Elmo Hutchison, Violent Truce, New York, 1956, pp. 95-96.

- 107 By the Mixed Armistice Commissions and on five occasions by the Security Council.
- 108 See Hutchison, op. cit., p. 11.
- 109 Ibid., p. 104.
- 110 Cited in Burns, op. cit., pp. 63-64.
- 111 Uri Avnery, "What an Israeli Really Thinks of American Zionists," Issues, Spring 1959; see also Hutchison, op. cit., pp. 120-122; and Carl Von Horn, Soldiering for Peace, London, 1966, p. 96.
- The Arab Summit Conference sent Arab Foreign Ministers to inform world capitals of its decisions and points of view. This was one of the points they stressed. Another was that they did not want war.
- 113 Golda Meier, February 28, 1964, in L'Orient (Beirut), February 29. Eshkol made similar statements to the Knesset, January 19, 1964, Le Monde, January 23, 1964.
- 114 April 16, 1965, L'Orient, April 17. This apology was the answer to angry protests by Israeli leaders and newspapers over a US offer reportedly made by American emissary Averell Harriman to grant Israel additional arms if it would react with greater caution to the Arab diversion plan. See Cahiers de l'Orient contemporain, LVII, pp. 28-29.
- Eshkol, for example, proclaimed: "Israel counts on its Army as well as the Great Powers to prevent the Arab diversion of the Jordan," L'Orient, January 20, 1965. And General Dayan declared: "The Army's force of persuasion will not be necessary as it was in 1956 to open the Port of Elath," The New York Times, March 26, 1965.
- 116 Nasser interview with Wilton Wynn, AP correspondent. October 8, 1959, in Arab World, October 9.
- 117 Journal de Geneve, April 22/23, 1966.
- 118 See Eric Rouleau et al., op. cit., pp. 82-110.
- 119 Annex II B of the Egyptian-Israeli Armistice Agreement.
- 120 US News & World Report, June 19, 1967, p. 42.
- 106 Cited in Bilby, op. cit., p. 105.